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I. INTRODUCTION

ince the 1970s, the law of armed conflict and international human rights
law have been locked into a gradual process of convergence.1 One of the
earliest outcomes of the rapprochement between these two branches of
international law was the revision of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 by
1. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL
LAW 239 (2000). Scholarship on the relationship between the two
legal regimes is extensive. For major treatments of the subject, with ample further references to the literature, see RENÉ PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Roberta Arnold & Noëlle N.
R. Quénivet eds., 2008); INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) and RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW (Robert Kolb & Gloria Gaggioli eds., 2013). See
also Symposium, International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Exploring
Parallel Application, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 306 (2007); Guglielmo Verdirame, Human
Rights in Wartime: A Framework for Analysis, 13 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
689 (2008); Michael J. Dennis & Andre M. Surena, Application of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation: The Gap Between Legal
Theory and State Practice, id. at 714; Philip Leach, The Chechen Conflict: Analysing the Oversight of
the European Court of Human Rights, id. at 732; Conor McCarthy, Human Rights and the Laws of
War under the American Convention on Human Rights, id. at 762; Symposium, The Relationship
between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, 14 JOURNAL OF
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 441 (2009).
OF INTERNATIONAL
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means of their Additional Protocols of 1977.2 The imprint of human rights
law can be detected across both protocols, most obviously in the form of
the fundamental guarantees incorporated into Article 75 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) and Article 4 of Additional Protocol II (AP II).3 In more recent times, international courts and judicial bodies have begun to play a
leading role in driving forward the convergence between the two regimes.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for example, has made a significant contribution to popularizing the notion that the
two are complementary in nature by drawing attention to their common
principles and objectives.4 In Coard, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights confirmed that international human rights law applies concurrently with the law of armed conflict during hostilities, declaring that the
application of one regime “does not necessarily exclude or displace the
other.”5 In a string of cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) likewise
affirmed that the protections offered by human rights conventions do not
cease in armed conflict.6 As these examples demonstrate, international
2. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. See Richard R. Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian
Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 1, 4–9 (1975). Regarding Additional Protocol II, see also Sylvie Junod, Human Rights and Protocol II, 23 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 246 (1983).
3. In this context, it is also worth noting the preamble to Additional Protocol II,
which recalls that “international instruments relating to human rights offer a basic protection to the human person” in what is the first explicit reference to human rights instruments in an agreement on humanitarian law. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at
1340 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
4. E.g., Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 149
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), recognizing that “[b]oth human rights and humanitarian law focus on respect for human values and the dignity of the
human person.” On the Tribunal’s caselaw on this area, see Robert Cryer, The Interplay of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Approach of the ICTY, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT
AND SECURITY LAW 511 (2009).
5. Bernard Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Amer. Comm. H.R., Report No. 109/99, ¶ 39 (1999). For an overview of the relevant jurisprudence under the
Inter-American system, see Christina M. Cerna, The History of the Inter-American System’s
Jurisprudence as Regards Situations of Armed Conflict, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES 3 (2011).
6. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 25 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]; Legal Consequences of the Construction of
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courts have become key participants in, and are helping to shape, a global
dialogue about the interaction between the law of armed conflict and international human rights law.
So far, the contribution of the European Court of Human Rights to
this dialogue has been muted, but has pioneered the extraterritorial application of international human rights law for years.7 As a result, the Court has
received a high number of applications alleging violations of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)8 in circumstances of armed conflict
and generalized violence. However, until recently, the Court has not
grasped the opportunity to pronounce on the relationship between the
Convention and the law of armed conflict. Other than the odd reference to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949,9 the European Court and now-defunct
European Commission on Human Rights did not find it necessary to rely
on the law of armed conflict in the numerous cases arising out of the invasion of Northern Cyprus by Turkey in 1974.10 In Al-Jedda, the Court investigated the scope of the obligations imposed by the law of belligerent occupation on an occupying power to protect the inhabitants of the occupied
territory against acts of violence, but did so in the light of the ECHR’s relationship with Article 103 of the United Nations Charter.11 It did not con-

a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 106
(July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19).
7. Scholarship on this subject too is extensive. For major contributions, see EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga eds., 2004); MARKO MILANOVIĆ, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011) and KAREN DA COSTA,
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2013).
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
9. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482, ¶ 313
(1982), where the European Commission of Human Rights found it unnecessary to examine the question of a breach of Article 5 of the Convention, which guarantees the freedom
of liberty, with regard to persons accorded the status of prisoners of war.
10. E.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Preliminary Objections, 20
E.H.R.R. 99 (1995). In the case of Jaloud v. The Netherlands, App. No. 47708/08 (2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-148367#{"itemid":["001148367"]}, the Court specifically pointed out that it did not have recourse to the concept
of “occupying power” within the meaning of the law of armed conflict in Loizidou and
other cases.
11. Article 103 of the Charter provides as follows: “In the event of a conflict between
the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
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sider whether the law of armed conflict provided a direct legal basis for the
respondent State’s conduct.12 However, recently the European Court’s jurisprudence has reached a turning point. In Hassan v. United Kingdom,13 it
addressed the relationship between the ECHR and the law of armed conflict directly and in express terms for the first time. Hassan is a very significant development, as we will discuss in greater detail below.14 In essence,
the Court has inserted a judge-made exception into the text of Article 5 of
the Convention to cover the detention of persons in conformity with the
Geneva Conventions of 1949.15 This not only signals a new-found readiness to rely on the law of armed conflict, but also a willingness to give effect to its rules even where they contradict the terms of the European
Convention.
Another significant development under the European Convention system has occurred at the domestic level, but points in the opposite direction:
the judgment delivered by the English High Court in May 2014 in Serdar
Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence.16 This case represents one of the latest chapters in the steady flow of legal challenges under the Human Rights Act
199817 arising from the United Kingdom’s involvement in the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.18 The judgment in Mohammed is of considerobligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail.”
12. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, 53 E.H.R.R. 23 (2011) [hereinafter Al-Jedda, European Court]. See Heike Krieger, After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and
an Enduring Dilemma, 50 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 419, 424–32
(2011); Jelena Pejic, The European Court of Human Rights’ Al-Jedda Judgment: The Oversight of
International Humanitarian Law, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 837
(2011); Maral Kashgar, The ECtHR's Judgment in Al-Jedda and its Implications for International
Humanitarian Law, 24 HUMANITÄRES VÖLKERRECHT 229 (2011).
13. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, Sept. 16, 2014,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146501#{"itemid":["001146501"]}. For comments, see Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, The Grand Chamber Judgment in
Hassan v UK, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-grand-chamberjudgment-in-hassan-v-uk/.
14. See infra Section III.C.
15. This is not uncontroversial. Hassan, supra note 13 (Spano, J., partly dissenting;
joined by Nicolaou, J.; Bianku, J.; and Kalaydjieva, J.).
16. Joined cases of Serdar Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence and Qasim et al. v. Secretary of State for Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB).
17. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents. The 1998 Act implements the ECHR in the UK.
18. Leading cases include R. (Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State for Defence
[2007] UKHL 26, [2008] 1 A.C. 153; R. (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007]
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able interest in the UK. For years commentators and politicians have expressed concerns that legal constraints, in particular those imposed by human rights law, are undermining the operational effectiveness of the British
armed forces.19 Mohammed seems to confirm these fears since it suggests
that international human rights law is the sole international legal framework
governing the detention of persons, including insurgent fighters, in a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC). However, the judgment is of interest
not just from a British or purely regional perspective. The interpretation
and application of the ECHR, whether before domestic authorities or before the Strasbourg court, has significant ramifications for legal interoperability.20 State parties to the ECHR frequently deploy their troops alongside
United States, Canadian and other forces in the execution of multinational
missions. The effectiveness of such operations requires a mutual understanding of the contributing States’ varying legal obligations. Moreover,
Mohammed has major implications for the relationship between international
human rights law and the law of armed conflict more generally. In short,
the judgment questions the existence of a legal basis under the law of
armed conflict for the conduct of status-based operations, that is lethal and
non-lethal operations targeting individuals based purely on their battlefield
status,21 in NIACs. The judgment is therefore of broader international significance.
We believe that the restrictive interpretation of the authority to detain
in NIACs adopted by the High Court in Mohammed is mistaken as a matter
of law and undesirable as a matter of policy. It drives the convergence between international human rights law and the law of armed conflict too far.
UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332 [hereinafter Al-Jedda, House of Lords]; R (Smith) v. Secretary
of State for Defence [2010] UKSC 29, [2011] 1 A.C. 1; and R (Smith) v. Secretary of State
for Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [2014] 1 A.C. 52.
19. For an assessment of this debate, see Aurel Sari, The Juridification of the British Armed
Forces and the European Convention on Human Rights: “Because it’s Judgment that Defeats Us,” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411070.
20. See Daniel Bethlehem, The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 2 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 180, 183–84 (2013). On legal interoperability
generally, see Charles Garraway, “England Does not Love Coalitions”: Does Anything Change?, in
THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEAPONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE 233 (Anthony M. Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies);
Marten Zwanenburg, International Humanitarian Law Interoperability in Multinational Operations,
95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 681 (2013).
21. On battlefield status, see GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 186–239 (2010).
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The conduct of status-based operations lies at the “very core” of the law of
armed conflict,22 both in international and in non-international armed conflicts. According primacy to human rights law principles would not only
subvert the law of armed conflict as it currently stands, but it would also
frustrate the effective conduct of military operations.23 That, in turn, would
almost certainly undermine respect for law in war.24 It is therefore imperative to explain why Mohammed is unconvincing. Following a brief review of
the High Court’s reasoning, we will develop our argument in two steps.
Section III.A examines the meaning and legal effect of Security Council
resolutions authorizing the use of “all necessary measures” under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. We argue that the judgment construes the meaning
of this phrase and the mandate set out in the resolutions relevant to the
present case too narrowly. Section IV examines the legal basis for statusbased operations under the law of armed conflict applicable in NIACs. We
suggest that the reasons for excluding an implicit legal basis for detention
in NIACs are not persuasive, that the authority to target certain persons on
the basis of their status does in fact imply a corresponding authority to detain them and that this power prevails over any conflicting obligations under the ECHR. Section V contains our conclusions.
II. SERDAR MOHAMMED: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES
Between December 2001 and December 2014, UK armed forces participated in the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

22. Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES
52, 74 (2010). It is in these “hard cases” that the law of armed conflict clashes most clearly
with the more stringent human rights law standards. See Michael N. Schmitt, Charting the
Legal Geography of Non-International Armed Conflict, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1, 2
(2014).
23. See Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 483, 492 (Raul A.
“Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College
International Law Studies); Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795, 837–39 (2011). See also Christopher Greenwood, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Conflict or Convergence, 43 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 491, 502–3 (2010).
24. Cf. Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 20–21 (2010).
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in Afghanistan.25 During this period, they were engaged in a multinational
NIAC pitting the government of Afghanistan and ISAF on one side against
various insurgent armed groups on the other side.26 Pursuant to the applicable Security Council resolutions, ISAF’s mandate was to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security.27 To this end, the contributing
States were authorized by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, to “take all necessary measures.”28 However, unlike the
relevant Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq,29 the Afghanistan
resolutions did not expressly spell out that contributing States were authorized to intern individuals in Afghanistan for imperative reasons of security.
In practice, ISAF forces have detained many suspected insurgents over the
25. ISAF was established pursuant to S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec.
20, 2001). In 2003, came under NATO command. Its mission terminated at the end of
2014 in accordance with S.C. Res. 2120, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2120 (Oct. 10, 2013). Since
January 2015, NATO continues to provide assistance to the Afghan security forces and
institutions through a follow-on operation called Resolute Support Mission. The new mission was welcomed, but not mandated, by S.C. Res. 2189, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2189 (Dec.
12, 2014). We discuss ISAF’s mandate and tasks in greater detail infra Section III.B.
26. The classification of the conflict(s) in Afghanistan has changed over time. See
Françoise J. Hampson, Afghanistan, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CONFLICTS 242 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). In 2012, the English Court of Appeal
expressed its “provisional view” that a certificate served by the UK Foreign Secretary stating that the conflict constituted a NIAC was conclusive of this fact. R. v. Gul (Mohammed), [2012] EWCA (Crim) 280, [22]; upheld by the Supreme Court in R. v. Gul (Mohammed), [2013] UKSC 64, [2013] 3 W.L.R. 1207, without considering the issue.
27. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, ¶ 1, authorized the establishment of “an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance
of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as
well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.” Since
then, the Security Council renewed and expanded ISAF’s mandate on several occasions.
For an overview, see Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 30–33.
28. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, ¶ 3. This authorization was repeated in all successive
resolutions extending ISAF’s authorization. See also Military Technical Agreement between
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan art. IV(2), Jan. 4, 2002, reprinted as an annex to U.N. Doc. S/2002/117 (Jan. 25,
2002) (which confers upon the ISAF Commander the “authority, without interference or
permission, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use
of military force, to protect the ISAF and its Mission”).
29. According to a letter from U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the President
of the Security Council, the functions of the Multinational Force in Iraq included “internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security.” S.C. Res. 1546, annex,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004). Resolution 1546 affirmed the mandate of the
Multinational Force in Iraq on the basis of this letter.
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years.30 Under ISAF’s standard operating procedures, such detainees were
to be transferred into the custody of the Afghan authorities, and into the
Afghan criminal justice system, within the timeframe of 96 hours.31 The
only exception foreseen to this “96-hour rule” was in cases where detention for a longer period of time was deemed necessary in order to affect the
release or transfer of the detainee in safe circumstances.32 Dissatisfied with
the operational difficulties these strict arrangements presented, on November 9, 2009, the UK adopted a “national policy caveat” to the 96-hour rule
which permitted, in exceptional circumstances, extended detention for the
purposes of obtaining significant new intelligence.33
During a military operation in northern Helmand on April 7, 2010, UK
armed forces captured Serdar Mohammed, a suspected Taliban commander. In accordance with the national detention principles now applied by
British forces, UK ministers approved Mr. Mohammed’s continued detention beyond 96 hours, by a further twenty-five days, for the purpose of interrogation. He was then held for an additional eighty-one days—a logistical extension—during which time the Afghan authorities were unable to
accept his transfer due to prison overcrowding. In total, Mr. Mohammed
was detained by UK armed forces for 110 days at UK bases at Camp Bastion and Kandahar Airfield. On July 25, 2010, he was transferred to the
custody of the Afghan authorities. He was subsequently prosecuted, convicted and, following an appeal to the Afghan Supreme Court, sentenced to
ten years imprisonment.
Mr. Mohammed then brought a civil damages claim against the UK
30. ISAF Standard Operating Procedures for Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel
identified three specific grounds for detention. Namely where detention is necessary for:
(i) ISAF force protection; (ii) self-defense of ISAF or its force; or (iii) accomplishment of
the ISAF mission. See International Security Assistance Force, SOP 632, Standard Operating Procedures for Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel ¶ 4 (2006), quoted in Mohammed,
supra note 16, ¶ 35.
31. “The current policy for ISAF is that detention is permitted for a maximum of 96
hours after which time an individual is either to be released or handed into the custody of
the [Afghan authorities].” Id., ¶ 5.
32. Id.
33. The Secretary of State for Defense stated “in exceptional circumstances, detaining
individuals beyond 96 hours can yield vital intelligence that would help protect our forces
and the local population—potentially saving lives.” Written Ministerial Statement in Parliament (Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200
809/cmhansrd/cm091109/wmstext/91109m0001.htm#column_5. The reasons justifying
the adoption of this caveat and the operation of the British detention policy are set out in
detail in Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 38–53.
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Secretary of State for Defence before the High Court of Justice of England
and Wales. He argued, inter alia, that his detention constituted a violation of
his right to liberty and security under Article 5 of the ECHR. In May 2014,
over the course of a tightly-argued judgment running well over one hundred pages, Mr Justice Leggatt (hereinafter “Leggatt J”) rejected the respondent’s various preliminary objections and held that Mr. Mohammed’s
continued detention after 96 hours amounted to a breach of Afghan law
and Article 5 of the Convention. He therefore had an “enforceable right”
to compensation under the Human Rights Act 1998. This conclusion was
underpinned by four essential findings.
First, as a detainee, the UK exercised effective control and authority
over Mr. Mohammed such as to bring him within its jurisdiction within the
meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR.34 The Convention therefore applied to
his detention in Afghanistan and the UK was under an obligation to ensure
that he enjoyed the benefit of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.
Second, Mr. Mohammed’s detention was attributable to the UK and
not to the UN, as the government had claimed.35 While the Security Council exercised effective control over ISAF in general terms, Mr. Mohammed’s detention had been authorized by the UK as a matter of national
policy outside the ISAF chain of command. Responsibility for his detention therefore lay with the UK.
Third, Article 5 of the ECHR was not displaced by virtue of the combined effect of the Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment

34. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 116–48. Article 1 of the ECHR provides that its Contracting Parties “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms
defined in Section I of this Convention.” The establishment of jurisdiction over a person
therefore operates as a threshold criterion triggering the applicability of the substantive
obligations set out in the Convention. Detention is one of the core examples of the personal model of jurisdiction which were identified by the European Court in Al-Skeini v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 E.H.R.R. 18, ¶ 136 (2011).
35. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 158–87. See also Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence), House of Lords Debates, columns 416–17
(Nov. 7, 2013), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhan
srd/text/131107-0003.htm. In making this argument, the government relied on the much
criticized judgment of the European Court in Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v.
France, Germany and Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 E.H.R.R. 10 (2007). For a
critical comment on the Court’s reasoning in that case, see Aurel Sari, Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases, 8 HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 151 (2008).
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of ISAF and Article 103 of the UN Charter.36 Leggatt J accepted that he
was bound by the House of Lords’ finding in Al-Jedda that Article 103 of
the Charter includes authorizations as well as obligations imposed by binding Security Council resolutions.37 However, in the present case, the applicable Security Council resolutions authorized ISAF to detain individuals
only for such time as it was necessary to transfer them into the custody of
the Afghan authorities. Since such limited powers of detention were compatible with the ECHR, no conflict arose between the Convention and
those resolutions.
Fourth, Leggatt J concluded that the rules of the law of armed conflict
applicable in NIACs merely recognize and regulate, but do not authorize,
detention.38 This conclusion was based on three main arguments. First,
Leggatt J found that the applicable treaty rules confer no legal authority on
States to detain persons in a NIAC either in express terms or by implication.39 Second, he rejected the government’s argument that the authority to
kill under the law of armed conflict implies an authority to capture and detain on security grounds.40 Finally, he found no evidence that a power to
detain on security grounds forms part of customary international law.41 In
the absence of any rule authorizing detention in a NIAC either expressly or
by implication, Leggatt J concluded that there was no conflict between the
law of armed conflict and Article 5 of the ECHR. Therefore, there was no
room for the argument that Article 5 was displaced or qualified by the law
of armed conflict in the present case.42 However, he went further, suggesting obiter that even if such an obligation did exist; it would not prevail over
the requirements of Article 5. In his view, “the only way in which the European Court or a national court required to apply Convention rights can
hold that IHL prevails over Article 5 is by applying the provisions for derogation contained in the Convention itself, and not by invoking the principle of lex specialis.”43
Leggatt J must be commended for a careful and meticulous engage36. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 188–227.
37. Al-Jedda, House of Lords, supra note 18, ¶¶ 26–39. By contrast, the European
Court had held, without elaborating, that Article 103 of the Charter is confined to strict
obligations. See Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 109.
38. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 228–68.
39. Id., ¶¶ 234–51.
40. Id., ¶ 253.
41. Id., ¶ 254.
42. Id., ¶ 293.
43. Id., ¶ 284.
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ment with what is a difficult area of international law. It is important to
underline that his reasoning is not confined to the narrow facts of the case.
The judgment rejects the existence of a legal basis in the law of armed conflict for security detention in NIACs with general effect. Moreover, the
same logic also denies the existence of a legal basis for other status-based
operations in a NIAC, including lethal targeting. Ultimately, however, the
reasoning is not convincing. The analysis of the meaning and effect of the
relevant Security Council resolutions and of the applicable rules of the law
of armed conflict is deeply problematic. Moreover, the weight placed on
derogations must be reassessed in light of the European Court’s judgment
in Hassan. We will now turn to examine these questions in greater detail.
III. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
In the Al-Jedda case, the House of Lords and the European Court of Human Rights disagreed over the meaning and effect of Article 103 of the UN
Charter. The terms of Article 103 are quite narrow. The provision provides
that UN member States’ obligations under the UN Charter prevail over
their obligations under any other international agreement in the case of a
conflict between the two sets of obligations.44 Since the wording of Article
103 only refers to “obligations,” it is not immediately clear whether the
provision applies to authorizations to take enforcement measures issued by
the Security Council in resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.45 Delivering the majority judgment in the House of Lords, Lord Bingham held that such authorizations were covered by Article 103.46 The pro44. See supra note 11.
45. The scope of Article 103 is a matter of debate in the literature. See Robert Kolb,
Does Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations Apply only to Decisions or also to Authorizations Adopted by the Security Council?, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 21 (2004); Rain Liivoja, The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the
United Nations Charter, 57 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 583
(2008); Johann Ruben Leiæ & Andreas Paulus, Article 103, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 2110 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012).
46. Al-Jedda, House of Lords, supra note 18, ¶¶ 26–39. On these points, see Christian
Tomuschat, R (On the Application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence: Human
Rights in a Multi-Level System of Governance and the Internment of Suspected Terrorists, 9 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391, 400–3 (2008); Aurel Sari, The Al-Jedda
Case before the House of Lords, 13 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 181, 185–
91 (2009); Francesco Messineo, The House of Lords in Al-Jedda and Public International Law:
Attribution of Conduct to UN-Authorized Forces and the Power of the Security Council to Displace
Human Rights, 56 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 35, 47–58 (2009).
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vision had to be interpreted broadly: while the Security Council is unable to
compel States to participate in military operations authorized under Chapter VII, States which take up such authorizations are bound to carry out the
mandate they voluntarily accepted. Since Security Council Resolution 1546
authorized the UK to exercise its powers of detention in Iraq where this
was necessary for imperative reasons of security,47 it followed that this authorization prevailed over any conflicting obligations arising under Article
5 of the European Convention.48 However, when the Al-Jedda case came to
Strasbourg, the European Court took a different view and decided that
Resolution 1546 did not impose an obligation to detain. According to the
Court, in the absence of clear and explicit language to the contrary, a presumption must exist that the Security Council does not intend to place UN
member States under an obligation to act contrary to their commitments
under international human rights law, including the ECHR.49 Since in the
European Court’s view such language was absent from Resolution 1546,
the latter did not displace the UK’s obligations under the Convention by
virtue of Article 103.50
In the present case, the government relied on the reasoning of the
House of Lords to argue that Security Council Resolution 1890,51 which
provided the legal basis for ISAF at the time, did impose an obligation to
detain Serdar Mohammed. In so far as this obligation was incompatible
with Article 5 of the ECHR, the government submitted that the doctrine of
precedent bound the High Court to follow the House of Lords, rather than
the European Court, and declare that Resolution 1890 displaced Article 5.
This argument set the High Court at odds with the European Court. Leggatt J resolved this predicament rather elegantly by distinguishing the present case from Al-Jedda. As he rightly pointed out, the fact that Resolution
1546 incorporated an express reference to the power to detain was key in
persuading the House of Lords in Al-Jedda to accept that the Security
Council imposed an obligation on the UK to detain individuals for security
reasons in Iraq.52 Since the reasoning hinged on the existence of such a ref47. See supra note 29.
48. Al-Jedda, House of Lords, supra note 18, ¶ 39.
49. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶¶ 102, 105. For strong support for this
presumption, see Marko Milanović, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUROPEAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121, 137–38 (2012).
50. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 109.
51. S.C. Res. 1890, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1890 (Oct. 8, 2009).
52. See supra note 29.
72

Targeting and Detention in NIACs

Vol. 91

erence, so did its value as a binding precedent. Unlike Resolution 1546, neither Security Council Resolution 1890 nor any of the earlier resolutions on
ISAF made an explicit reference to the power to detain. Accordingly, Leggatt J concluded that the High Court was not bound by the interpretation
of Resolution 1546 adopted by the House of Lords in Al-Jedda, but was
free to assess the meaning of Resolution 1890 independently and on its
own terms.53
In interpreting Resolution 1890, Leggatt J was prepared to accept the
government’s submission that the power to detain was implicit in its terms,
but only subject to the following qualification:
I accept this argument so far as it goes. In particular, I accept that the
UNSCRs relating to Afghanistan were plainly intended to authorise the
use of lethal force at least for the purposes of self-defence. I also accept
that in these circumstances it must be the case that ISAF personnel were
authorised to take the lesser step of accepting the surrender of individuals
who were believed to pose an imminent threat to them or to the civilian
population. I see no necessary implication, however, that this authorisation was intended to give ISAF a power to continue to hold individuals in
detention outside the Afghan criminal justice system after they had been
arrested and therefore ceased to be an imminent threat.54

Accordingly, Leggatt J held that there was no conflict between Resolution 1890 and Article 5 of the Convention. This interpretation is too narrow. It misapprehends the meaning of the phrase “all necessary measures,”
applies the presumption of human rights-conformity established by the
European Court in Al-Jedda too rigidly and misreads the scope of ISAF’s
mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions.
A. All Necessary Measures
In construing the meaning of the words “all necessary measures” used in
Resolution 1890, Leggatt J proceeded on the basis that in Al-Jedda the
House of Lords did not decide that this phrase carried an “established or
conventional meaning” whenever it was used by the Security Council.55
This is of course correct, inasmuch as the House of Lords indeed did not
define the meaning of the phrase. The High Court therefore was not
53. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 217.
54. Id., ¶ 219.
55. Id., ¶ 214.
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bound by any precedent on this point. However, this does not mean that
the formula “all necessary measures” has not acquired a sufficiently precise
meaning within the Security Council’s practice. On the contrary, its meaning is too well-established for domestic courts to overlook.56
1. The Meaning of the Phrase
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council enjoys the authority to adopt enforcement measures.57 The original intention was that
such measures were to be carried out by the UN directly, relying on military assets and forces made available to it pursuant to Article 43 of the
Charter.58 However, this scheme was never implemented.59 Instead, the Security Council has relied on alternative arrangements; in particular coalitions of the willing authorized to act on its behalf.60 Although this practice

56. Indeed, the formula has been described as the example “par excellence” of a
shared understanding embedded in the Security Council’s interpretative practice. See
Efthymios Papastavridis, Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII in the
Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis, 56 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 83,
101 (2007).
57. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004); THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, COLLECTIVE SECURITY 188 (2011).
58. See Nico Krisch, Article 43, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1351. For a comparison of the original intentions of the drafters and the subsequent practice of the Security Council, see Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 506 (1995).
59. However, proposals to revive this scheme are made on a regular basis. See, e.g.,
James E. Rossman, Article 43: Arming the United Nations Security Council, 27 NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 227 (1994). For an overview of such efforts, see Adam Roberts, Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History,
in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR, supra note 57, at 99.
60. See Helmut Freudenschuß, Between Unilateralism and Collective Security: Authorizations
of the Use of Force by the UN Security Council, 5 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 492 (1994); Nigel D. White & Özlem Ülgen, The Security Council and the Decentralised
Military Option: Constitutionality and Function, 44 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 378 (1997); DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OF ITS
CHAPTER VII POWERS (1999); Nils Blokker, Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing,”
11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 541 (2000).
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raises various difficulties,61 it is now settled and accepted as a matter of
law.62 As part of this practice, the Security Council has employed the phrase
“all necessary means” or “all necessary measures” to authorize States to act
in the implementation of Chapter VII.63 Although the phrase is not free
from ambiguities,64 three aspects are nevertheless beyond doubt.
First, by authorizing States to take “all necessary measures,” the Security Council is delegating its own powers under Chapter VII.65 Chapter VII
confers upon the Security Council the authority to adopt measures not involving the use of armed forces under Article 41, and measures that do involve reliance on armed forces under Article 42. As far as enforcement action under Article 42 is concerned,66 the Security Council is not constrained
61. One such difficulty concerns the need for sufficient oversight by the Security
Council. See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1999); Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization: International Law
and the Use of Force against Iraq, 13 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2002).
Another difficulty concerns the proper attribution of internationally wrongful conduct
carried out by armed forces acting pursuant to a Security Council mandate. In addition to
the authorities cited in supra note 35, see Paolo Palchetti, The Allocation of Responsibility for
Internationally Wrongful Acts Committed in the Course of Multinational Operations, 95 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 727 (2013).
62. Cf. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 167 (July 20) (“It cannot be said that the Charter
has left the Security Council impotent in the face of an emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 have not been concluded.”). See also Nico Krisch, Article 42, in THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1330, 1337–38.
63. Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 1237, 1264 [hereinafter
Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII].
64. Nabil Hajjami, Que Signifie l’Expression « Prendre Toutes les Mesures Nécessaires » dans la
Pratique du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, 47 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 232, 233 (2013).
65. See SAROOSHI, supra note 60, at 142–284. This point is sometimes misunderstood.
In Al-Jedda, for example, the majority in the House of Lords took the view that the Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of the Multinational Force in Iraq did
not involve a delegation of the Security Council’s powers. See Al-Jedda, House of Lords,
supra note 18, ¶ 23. See also Keir Starmer, Responsibility for Troops Abroad: UN Mandated Forces
and Issues of Human Rights Accountability, 3 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 318,
335–36 (2008). But this view is mistaken. See SAROOSHI, supra note 60, at 13; Sari, supra
note 46, at 193–94.
66. On the nature of action taken under Article 42 of the Charter, see Certain Expenses,
supra note 62, at 164–65. See also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision
on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 31, 33 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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to act in self-defense as States are under Article 51, but may deploy armed
forces for the far broader purpose of maintaining or restoring international
peace and security. The point is illustrated by Security Council Resolution
678 adopted in response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August
1990.67 Famously, Resolution 678 not only recognized the right of individual and collective self-defense, but also authorized the use of “all necessary
means” to restore international peace and security in the area.68 As this example demonstrates, the phrase “all necessary measures” is capable of covering the entire spectrum of enforcement authority enjoyed by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, including the authority to use force in the interests of international peace and security for purposes beyond individual
or collective self-defense within the meaning of Article 51.
Second, it is also evident that the Security Council does not authorize
the full range of its enforcement powers every time it employs the phrase
“all necessary measures.” This follows from the very language used, since it
permits only those measures which are necessary. What is necessary depends
in each particular case on the specific mandate, its general context and any
other conditions laid down in the resolution concerned.69 The level and
type of force entailed by the phrase “all necessary measures” is therefore
highly contextual. For example, in Security Council Resolution 1973,70 the
Council authorized the use of all necessary measures “to protect civilians
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,” while at the same time expressly excluding “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.”71
Third, subject to the foregoing point, the phrase “all necessary
measures” is nevertheless meant to permit the use of some military force in
the implementation of the mandate.72 Whenever the Security Council limits
67. S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
68. Id., ¶ 2. For a critical assessment of the scope of this authorization, see Burns H.
Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy,
85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 516, 525–28 (1991).
69. Cf. Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08, 56 E.H.R.R. 18, ¶¶ 175, 177 (2013).
See also Hajjami, supra note 64, at 250–55.
70. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Feb. 26, 2011).
71. On the scope of the authorization, see Chris De Cock, Operation Unified Protector
and the Protection of Civilians in Libya, 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 213, 217–19 (2011).
72. This is evident from its drafting history. See Christopher Greenwood, New World
Order or Old? The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law, 55 MODERN LAW REVIEW 153, 166
(1992). As Professor Dinstein notes, the phrase has become “the common euphemism for
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itself to adopting measures under Article 41, it specifically identifies the
measures to be taken. By contrast, it routinely uses the generic phrase “all
necessary measures” to authorize enforcement action under Article 42. Indeed, the wording of the phrase echoes the language of that provision.73 In
some cases, the mandate may not require the use of lethal force beyond
what is permissible for individual self-defense and law enforcement purposes. However, it is notable that even in such cases it is taken for granted
that the use of lethal force is authorized to ensure the mission’s freedom of
movement in order to accomplish its mandate.74 Although such a concept
of “active” or “extended” self-defense75 is not necessarily incompatible
with the strict requirements governing the use of lethal force under international human rights law,76 it does stretch the boundaries of those requirements close to their breaking point.77 In other cases, such as Security
Council Resolutions 678 and 1973, the mandate clearly envisages the use of
lethal force beyond what would be permissible for the purposes of individual self-defense and domestic law enforcement. Consequently, while it is
not inconceivable that a mandate authorizing the use of “all necessary
measures” can be carried out strictly within the confines of international

the use of force.” YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 327 (5th
ed. 2011). However, the connection between the phrase and the use of force was employed before the 1990s. See Hajjami, supra note 64, at 235–37.
73. Article 42 of the Charter thus permits the Security Council to “take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security” (emphasis added).
74. Rob McLaughlin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal Force When Operating
under a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII Mandate Authorising “All Necessary Means,”
12 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 389, 410–13 (2007).
75. See Hans F. R. Boddens Hosang, Force Protection, Unit Self-Defence, and Extended SelfDefence, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
415, 424 (Dieter Fleck & Terry D. Gill eds., 2010).
76. Cf. Nigel D. White, Security Council Mandates and the Use of Lethal Force by Peacekeepers:
What Place for the Laws of War?, in CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO THE LAWS OF WAR:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR PETER ROWE 95, 109–10 (Caroline Harvey, James
Summers & Nigel D. White eds., 2014).
77. See Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles on the Use of
Force and Fire-arms by Law Enforcement Officials, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1,
at 112, ¶ 9 (1990) (“intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life”).
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human rights law,78 frequently this is not the case. In such circumstances,
pursuant to Article 103 of the Charter, the Security Council resolutions
concerned provide States implementing the mandate with a legal basis to
act contrary to their international human rights law obligations.79
2. The Requirement of Clear and Explicit Language
In line with the foregoing, the European Court in Al-Jedda accepted in
principle that the Security Council may compel States to act in contravention of their obligations under the ECHR and that in such cases their Charter obligations prevail over their obligations under the Convention.80 However, the Court also held, correctly, that such an outcome does not arise
lightly, since the Security Council must be presumed not to intend to impose obligations on States in breach of fundamental human rights. 81 Yet
how does one determine whether the Security Council has acted contrary
to that presumption? According to the European Court, the presumption is
reversed only where the Council uses “clear and explicit” language to this
effect.82
As regards the requirement of “explicit” language, we must remember
that the European Court is guided in the interpretation of Security Council
resolutions by the principles laid down by the ICJ.83 These principles draw
inspiration from the rules of treaty interpretation found in Articles 31 and
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.84 A Security
Council resolution must be interpreted not only with reference to its terms,
78. Strictly within the confines of international human rights law here means without
having recourse to derogations or the principle of lex specialis to displace conflicting human
rights obligations.
79. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in
the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
361, 370–72 (2000).
80. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 101. The Court’s substantive analysis of
the relevant resolutions would have been utterly pointless if it had not accepted that Article 103 of the Charter could, in principle, have this effect. This is so notwithstanding the
fact that the Court’s analysis may have been aimed to avoid the actual application of Article 103. See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Collective Security and Human Rights, in HIERARCHY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43, 61 (Erika De Wet & Jure
Vidmar eds., 2012).
81. Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII, supra note 63, at 1265–66.
82. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 102.
83. Id., ¶ 76.
84. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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but also in the light of “all circumstances that might assist in determining
the legal consequences of the resolution.”85 More recently, the ICJ added
that the interpretation of resolutions may also require an analysis of
“statements by representatives of members of the Security Council made at
the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the Security Council on the
same issue, as well as the subsequent practice of relevant United Nations
organs and of States affected by those given resolutions.”86 Bearing in mind
this guidance, Security Council resolutions authorizing “all necessary
measures” must be interpreted in the light of the role and meaning that this
phrase has acquired in the implementation of Chapter VII. Practice shows
that the Security Council employs the formula to authorize the use of lethal
force in excess of what is permitted as a matter of international human
rights law, typically without using more express language to qualify or displace the human rights obligations of the States acting pursuant to such
Chapter VII mandates. Under these circumstances, the use of the phrase
“all necessary measures” must be understood to satisfy the European
Court’s requirement for “explicit” language. To insist on further express
language not only contradicts the consistent and well-established practice
of the Council and the member States of the UN in the interpretation and
implementation of the Charter,87 but it would also see the European Court
or domestic courts seeking to place conditions upon the Security Council
which they have no authority to impose. Moreover, such an approach is
impractical, as it would require the Security Council to spell out in advance
each element of the authorization or amend the enabling resolution in or-

85. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21). See also Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of
Security Council Resolutions, 2 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 73
(1998); Papastavridis, supra note 56, 89–111.
86. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, ¶ 94 (July 22).
87. This practice would appear to qualify without too much difficulty as “subsequent
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Article 31(3)(b). On the criteria of “subsequent practice” within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(b), see WOLFRAM KARL, VERTRAG UND SPÄTERE PRAXIS IM VÖLKERRECHT:
ZUM EINFLUSS DER PRAXIS AUF INHALT UND BESTAND VÖLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRÄGE 184–95 (1983); ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 165–67
(2007); RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 225–45 (2010).
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der to cater to constantly evolving circumstances.88
As regards the requirement for the use of “clear” language, the nature
and level of force entailed by an authorization to use “all necessary
measures” must be determined with reference to the express terms of the
relevant resolution, as interpreted in the light of the factors identified by
the ICJ. For example, the nature and level of force authorized by Resolution 678 has to be determined in the light of the preceding decisions of the
Security Council on the same subject, including Resolutions 660 and 662. 89
In those instruments, the Security Council condemned Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait as a breach of international peace and security, demanded that Iraq
withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces, and expressed its
determination to bring the occupation of Kuwait to an end and restore the
authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait. The language of these
resolutions clearly establishes that Resolution 678 was meant to authorize a
degree of force which exceeded the limits of law enforcement and thus the
confines of international human rights law.90 Interpreting that authorization
subject to, for example, the requirements of Article 2 of the ECHR would
have been grossly inadequate and would have failed to give effect to the
Security Council’s intention to “secure full compliance with its decisions.”91
Such a narrow approach would contradict the interpretative principles established by the ICJ, as accepted by the European Court, and defy the “imperative nature” of the Security Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.92

88. It is not the Security Council’s practice to identify the individual elements of the
authorization. For an exception, see S.C. Res. 169, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/169 (Nov. 24,
1961).
89. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/662 (Aug. 9, 1990).
90. See Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?, 85
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 506, 514 (1991), who suggests that the
actions contemplated included “whatever attacks against Iraq were reasonably necessary to
attain the end: i.e., bombing and other attacks on troops, installations, and military equipment in Iraq as well as Kuwait.”
91. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 67, pmbl. para. 4. See also ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008)
(“[t]he effective interpretation of Security Council resolutions follows from the need to
give proper effect to the will of and agreement within the Security Council”).
92. Behrami, supra note 35, ¶ 148.
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B. ISAF’s Mandate
Armed with these considerations, we can now turn to the Security Council
resolutions governing the activities of ISAF at the time of Mr. Mohammed’s detention. Leggatt J held that these instruments authorized ISAF to
exercise powers of detention solely for the purpose of accepting the surrender of individuals believed to constitute an imminent threat and while
pending their release or transfer to the Afghan criminal justice system.93
Leggatt J was led to this conclusion by three considerations.
1. Respect for Sovereignty
First, he declared that ISAF’s powers of detention were limited because its
mandate was confined to assisting the Afghan government in the maintenance of security.94 In support of this point, he noted that the applicable
Security Council resolutions expressly affirmed the “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan” and recognized that “responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout Afghanistan
resided with the Afghan authorities.”95
Care must be taken not to misread these pronouncements. In Resolution 1973, the Security Council employed nearly identical language to affirm its commitment to Libya’s sovereignty and reiterate that the responsibility to protect the civilian population lay with the Libyan authorities.96
Surely, the Council recalled these principles not to detract from the mandate laid down in Resolution 1973, but restated them precisely because the
mandate authorized measures which otherwise would negate them.97 For
93. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 219.
94. Id., ¶ 220.
95. E.g., S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, pmbl. paras. 4, 9; S.C. Res. 1510, pmbl. paras.
2, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1510 (Oct. 13, 2003).
96. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 70, pmbl. paras. 4, 20.
97. This is consistent with the Security Council’s practice in this area. For example,
S.C. Res. 1894, pmbl. paras. 5, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009) on the protection of civilians in time of war notes that
States bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law” and reaffirms “that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take
all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.”

However, Resolution 1894 goes on to affirm the Security Council’s “willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian
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the same reason, the references to the sovereignty of Afghanistan and the
primary responsibility of the Afghan authorities for providing security
should not be read as detracting from ISAF’s mandate, but as affirming
these principles notwithstanding ISAF’s presence and mission in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the nature of ISAF’s mandate cannot be derived from
these pronouncements, but must be established with reference to the specific tasks assigned to it in the applicable Security Council resolutions.
2. Authority to Engage in Hostilities
Second, while Leggatt J accepted that the relevant Security Council resolutions conferred a power to detain on ISAF by implication, he took the view
that “there is nothing in the language of UNSCR 1890 which demonstrates—let alone in clear and unambiguous terms—an intention to require
or authorise detention contrary to international human rights law.”98 This
position is open to question. As we discussed earlier, the reference to “all
necessary measures” in Resolution 1890 and its predecessors constitutes
explicit language authorizing, in principle, the use of coercive measures in
excess of what is normally permitted under international human rights law.
To determine whether or not the implementation of ISAF’s mandate did in
fact require enforcement action beyond those limits, it is necessary to assess the scope and nature of its tasks in more detail.
ISAF was established by Security Council Resolution 1386 as the force
“envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement” in order “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.”99 The Bonn Agreement was drawn up in December 2001
to re-establish the power of the Afghan authorities and pave the way for
the creation of permanent institutions of government.100 Annex 1 of the
assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration
of appropriate measures at the Security Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations” (¶ 4). This reflects the tension between State sovereignty and collective security action addressed in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See Georg Nolte, Article
2 (7), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 45, at 280,
301–5.
98. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 221.
99. S.C. Res. 1386, supra note 25, ¶ 1.
100. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Dec. 5, 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001)
(containing Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement)).
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Agreement addressed the need for the deployment of an “International
Security Force.” It began by underlining that responsibility for providing
security and law resided with the Afghans themselves.101 To this end, the
participants in the Bonn talks pledged themselves to do all within their
means to ensure security and requested the international community to assist the new Afghan authorities “in the establishment and training of new
Afghan security and armed forces.”102 However, since it was likely to take
some time before these new forces were fully constituted and functioning,
the participants requested the Security Council “to consider authorizing the
early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force” in
order to “assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas.”103
ISAF’s original mandate therefore had two closely connected but distinct aspects. First, ISAF was mandated to assist the Afghan authorities in
establishing and training new security forces and in the rehabilitation of
Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Second, ISAF was also mandated to assist the
Afghan authorities in the maintenance of security in defined geographical
areas in the absence of local security forces. Accordingly, ISAF was tasked
not only to play a supportive role, but also to carry out executive security
functions of its own.104 Following NATO’s assumption of command over
ISAF in August 2003, Security Council Resolution 1510 extended ISAF’s
mandate to areas beyond Kabul and expanded it to include providing “security assistance for the performance of other tasks in support of the Bonn
Agreement.”105 While this enlarged the range of tasks ISAF carried out in
support of the Afghan authorities, it did not restrict ISAF’s executive functions. On the contrary, their scope and intensity increased. In this respect,
it is important to bear in mind the context in which ISAF operated.
All Security Council resolutions concerning ISAF’s mandate prominently recall Resolutions 1368 and 1373 adopted in response to the attacks
of September 11, 2001.106 These resolutions affirm the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense and affirm the need to combat by all
101. Id., Annex, ¶ 1.
102. Id., Annex, ¶¶ 1, 2.
103. Id., Annex, ¶ 3.
104. This was underlined by the pledge given by the participants in the Bonn talks to
“withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in which
the UN mandated force is deployed.” Id., Annex, ¶ 4.
105. S.C. Res. 1510, supra note 95, ¶ 1.
106. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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means, in accordance with the UN Charter, threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts.107 Evidently, the Security Council considered these resolutions relevant to ISAF’s mandate. In fact, Resolution
1510 called upon ISAF to work in close consultation with the Operation
Enduring Freedom coalition in the implementation of its tasks, while Resolution 1707 welcomed the increased coordination between ISAF and the
coalition.108 Moreover, it must be recognized that ISAF operated in the
context of an ongoing NIAC involving itself and the Afghan authorities on
one side and insurgents and other opposing forces on the other side. 109
Around the time of Mr. Mohammed’s detention, ISAF’s strength stood at
close to 150,000 personnel, including around 9,500 British troops. 110 Following the adoption of a more robust posture in 2009,111 ISAF’s mission as
defined by NATO was to conduct “comprehensive, population-centric
counterinsurgency operations” and support the Afghan authorities “in order to neutralize the enemy, safeguard the people, enable establishment of
acceptable governance, and provide a secure and stable environment.”112
Accordingly, at the time of Mr. Mohammed’s capture, ISAF assisted the
Afghan authorities in re-establishing security in their country by, among
other things, engaging in the conduct of hostilities in its area of operations.
In the light of the foregoing, it is entirely unconvincing to construe the
relevant Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1890, as restricting the use of force by ISAF to individual or unit-level self-defense and law
enforcement only. This ignores the fact that the Security Council evidently
considered ISAF to be involved in an armed conflict. Beginning with Reso107. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 106, pmbl. paras. 2, 3; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 106,
pmbl. paras. 4, 5.
108. S.C. Res. 1510, supra note 95, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1707, pmbl. para. 10, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1707 (Sept. 12, 2006). See also S.C. Res. 1833, pmbl. para. 19, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1833 (Sept. 22, 2008); S.C. Res. 1890, supra note 51, pmbl. para. 22, ¶ 5.
109. See supra note 26.
110. House of Commons Defence Committee, Operations in Afghanistan, Fourth Report of Session 2010–12, at 33–34 (July 6, 2011), available at http://www.public
ations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/554/554.pdf.
111. See Letter from Stanley A. McChrystal, General, U.S. Army, Commander, United
States Forces—Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, to
Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense: COMISAF’s Initial Assessment (Aug. 30, 2009),
available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/Assessment
_Redacted_092109.pdf.
112. ISAF OPLAN 38302 (Revision 4, Sept. 25, 2009), quoted in U.S. Department of
Defense, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan 11 (2010), available at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/November_1230_Report_FINAL.pdf.
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lution 1776, the Security Council started to recall its resolutions on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and to make reference to the need to
uphold international humanitarian law.113 In Resolution 1890, it condemned “in the strongest terms all attacks, including Improvised Explosive
Device (IED) attacks, suicide attacks and abductions, targeting civilians and
Afghan and international forces” and stressed the need for sustained international efforts, including those of ISAF, to address the threat posed by
the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups.114 It also expressed its
serious concern with the high number of civilian casualties, recognized the
additional efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimize
them, and called for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.115 Given the nature of the threat posed by the insurgency, it
is unrealistic to suggest that the Security Council did not authorize ISAF to
address that threat through the conduct of hostilities against the armed
groups involved. If ISAF had exceeded its mandate in doing so, the Security Council would have had ample opportunities to redraw or clarify the
boundaries of its authorization. It never did so. Instead, the Council consistently welcomed ISAF’s efforts and expanded and extended its mandate
on successive occasions.
3. Compliance with International Human Rights Law
Finally, Leggatt J also relied on the fact that Resolution 1890 expressly calls
for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.116
Two points are worth noting in this respect. First, in calling for compliance
with these two bodies of law, the Security Council stopped short of declaring that they formally applied in the present context. Evidently, the Council
must have believed this to be the case; otherwise it would not have invoked
them. Nonetheless, the application of either body of law to ISAF operations remained subject to their respective rules governing their applicabil-

113. S.C. Res. 1776, pmbl. paras. 3, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (Sept. 19, 2007).
114. S.C. Res. 1890, supra note 51, pmbl. paras. 12–14.
115. Id., pmbl. paras. 15, 16. On civilian causalities during this period, see United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan & Afghanistan Independent Human Rights
Commission, 2010 Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan
(2011),
available
at
http://www.unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human
rights/March PoC Annual Report Final.pdf.
116. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 222.
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ity.117 Second, the Security Council invoked both humanitarian and human
rights law, without addressing their relationship. However, simply by leaving this question open, it cannot be presumed that the Security Council
intended to subject the conduct of military operations by ISAF to the more
restrictive standards of international human rights law. Indeed, on such a
view, it would have been superfluous for the Security Council to refer to
international humanitarian law at all. Moreover, as we found earlier, those
more restrictive standards would have prevented ISAF from carrying out
the mandate to its full effect. Consequently, to the extent that the rules of
the law of armed conflict governing the use of lethal force and other coercive measures against individuals displace or qualify the standards of international human rights law during armed conflict, the reference in Resolution 1890 to both bodies of law in fact undermines Leggatt J’s reasoning.
Overall, the interpretation of ISAF’s mandate adopted by the High
Court is too restrictive. It is based on the assumption that ISAF was required to carry out its task in strict conformity with international human
rights law and limit itself to using lethal force only for the purposes of individual self-defense and law enforcement. Our analysis of the Security
Council’s practice under Chapter VII, as well as the terms and context of
the resolutions defining ISAF’s mandate, demonstrates that this assumption is mistaken. ISAF was authorized and expected to engage actively in
armed conflict. This means that it was authorized to operate pursuant to a
conduct of hostilities paradigm, subject to the rules of the law of armed
conflict, rather than a law enforcement paradigm.118 Contrary to Leggatt J’s
conclusions, ISAF’s authority to use lethal force was not limited to targeting only individuals who posed an imminent threat. Nor was its authority
to detain individuals therefore limited to accepting their surrender and neutralizing the imminent threat they posed, pending their release or transfer
to the Afghan authorities.119 Additionally, in so far as States contributing

117. For example, nothing suggests that the Security Council intended Resolution
1890 to extend, through its Chapter VII powers, the application of the ECHR either to
ISAF as a whole or to the national contingents contributed by the contracting parties of
the Convention. Had that been the case, it would have been quite superfluous for the
High Court to consider the extraterritorial applicability of the Convention in the present
case. See Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 116–48.
118. On the notion of these paradigms and the difference between them, see NILS
MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83–90, 243–99 (2008).
119. Leggatt J accepted that the authority to use lethal force implies an authority to
capture. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 219. If ISAF was authorized to use lethal force be86
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troops to ISAF acted pursuant to this authorization, it follows from the
principles accepted by the European Court in Al-Jedda that they carried out
obligations which prevailed, in accordance with Article 103 of the UN
Charter, over any conflicting commitments they undertook in the ECHR.
IV. STATUS-BASED OPERATIONS IN NIACS
As we have just found, Security Council Resolution 1890 had two main
legal effects. It authorized ISAF to take all necessary measures in order to
implement its mandate, including the use of lethal force and other restrictive measures exceeding the limits of individual self-defense and law enforcement. And, in combination with Article 103, this authorization prevailed over the conflicting obligations imposed on the UK by Article 5 of
the ECHR. The government argued that the same two legal effects also
flowed from the rules of the law of armed conflict: the law of armed conflict provided a legal authority to detain Mr. Mohammed on security
grounds and that authority displaced or qualified the stricter requirements
of Article 5 of the Convention. As indicated earlier, Leggatt J dismissed
both of these arguments. In this Section, we submit that the government’s
position is the more persuasive one.
A. Treaty Law
Leggatt J relied on a series of arguments to reject the government’s submissions.120 He examined in some detail the treaty rules applicable in NIACs,
namely Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (CA3) and AP II of
1977.121 Neither set of rules confers an express authorization upon belligerent parties to detain individuals. Moreover, Leggatt J found that those rules
also do not provide an implicit legal basis for detention. He offered five
reasons for this conclusion.
1. Lack of Express Authority
Leggatt J held that it was reasonable to assume that if CA3 and AP II were
intended to confer an authority to detain persons in a NIAC, they would
yond the confines of individual self-defense and law enforcement, it follows that it was
authorized to detain individuals beyond those limits as well.
120. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 228–68.
121. Id., ¶¶ 234–51.
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have done so in express terms, just as Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention makes express provision for the power to detain prisoners of war
in an international armed conflict.122 Elsewhere in his judgment, Leggatt J
himself supplies the reasons why it is not in fact reasonable to make such
an assumption.123
As is well known, States have for a long time been reluctant to regulate
the conduct of hostilities in civil wars as a matter of international law. 124
Their reluctance was motivated to a large extent by a desire not to grant
any legitimacy and legal recognition to rebels, insurgents and other nonState actors taking up arms against them.125 That attitude has not changed.
Consequently, when States eventually agreed to extend the law of armed
conflict to NIACs, initially in the form of CA3 and later through AP II,
they did so subject to two key restrictions. First, the treaty rules applicable
to NIACs were rudimentary compared to the rules applicable in international armed conflicts. Second, their primary aim was to offer legal protections to individuals from the adverse consequences of armed conflict. This
humanitarian focus was key to securing the adoption of CA3 and AP II
since the grant of minimum protections to rebels does not entail the grant
of legitimacy or status.126 By contrast, the conferral of prisoner of war sta122. Id., ¶ 242. Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention declares that the “Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment” and goes on to impose various
conditions on the exercise of this power. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. See, similarly, Articles
42–43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning the internment of civilians
where necessary, including on grounds of security. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
123. See Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 245.
124. LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 317–18 (2d
ed. 2000); LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 49–60, 99–107 (2006); SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN,
THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 9–53 (2012).
125. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat: Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction
of War, 43 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 19 (2004). See also Waldemar
A. Solf, Problems with the Application of Norms Governing Interstate Armed Conflict to NonInternational Armed Conflict, 13 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 291, 292–93 (1983); EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS
AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 69–74 (2010).
126. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 44 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958); COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 4500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds.,
1987).
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tus on rebel fighters would have implied some form of legal recognition
and therefore remains controversial to this very day.127 Similarly, any attempt to prescribe the grounds for detention in NIACs would have given
rise to the same controversy. Seen from this perspective, it is not at all reasonable to assume that CA3 and AP II would have spelled out the legal
basis for detention in express terms. In any event, the fact that they fail to
do so does not exclude the possibility, either in logic or in law, that international law may contain alternative legal bases for detention in NIACs.
2. No Implied Language
In a closely related argument, Leggatt J held that there is nothing in the
language of CA3 and AP II which suggests that they were meant to confer
an authority to detain by implication.128 Both sets of rules take for granted,
as a matter of fact, that in times of armed conflict persons are deprived of
their liberty. Both therefore accord certain safeguards to such persons
without, however, providing a legal basis for their detention. This is a plausible interpretation of the terms of CA3 and AP II if viewed in isolation.
However, the existence of an implicit legal authority to detain must be assessed with reference to the context, object and purpose of CA3 and AP II.
In any event, even if correct, this interpretation merely posits the absence
of an implicit legal basis for detention in CA3 and AP II, but once again
does not rule out the existence of such a legal basis under customary law.
3. Purely Humanitarian Purpose
Leggatt J declared that the “purely humanitarian purpose” pursued by CA3
and AP II is inconsistent with the idea that they were designed to confer a
legal power of detention.129 There is nothing objectionable about this argument if it was merely meant to repeat the earlier finding that CA3 and
AP II grant certain safeguards to detainees without providing a legal basis
for their detention. However, it is misconceived if it was meant to suggest
that status-based detention is incompatible with the humanitarian nature of
127. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 513–26; ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR:
LAWFUL INTERNMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT 451–59 (2013).
128. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 243. To similar effect, see John Cerone, Jurisdiction and
Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict in an
Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 396, 404 (2007).
129. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 244.
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CA3 and AP II. Humanitarian considerations are, of course, at the forefront of the law of armed conflict.130 Indeed, it is popular nowadays to assume that they are its main purpose.131 Writing in 1952, Hersch Lauterpacht already advised:
We shall utterly fail to understand the true character of the law of war unless we realize that its purpose is almost entirely humanitarian in the literal
sense of the word, namely, to prevent or mitigate suffering and, in some
cases, to rescue life from the savagery of battle and passions. This, and
not the regulation and direction of hostilities, is its essential purpose.132

However, contrary to Lauterpacht’s suggestion, humanitarian objectives have never been the sole preoccupation of the law of armed conflict.
Its other purpose has always been the regulation of hostilities.133 The detailed rules of AP I concerning targeting attest to the fact that rules designed to protect the victims of war coexist with rules designed to regulate
the conduct of hostilities to this very day.134 Focusing on its humanitarian
aspects at the expense of its warfighting dimension ignores the dual character of the law of armed conflict.135 This approach also overlooks two im130. E.g., the famous Martens clause in the preamble of Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No.
403. On the uncertain meaning and effect of the clause, see Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens
Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 37 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 125
(1997); Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (2000); Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause,
Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2000).
131. According to the ICJ, at the heart of the principles and rules of the law of armed
conflict is the “overriding consideration of humanity.” Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 95.
See also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1, Judgment, ¶ 183 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
132. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRITISH
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360, 363–64 (1952).
133. E.g., Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationship of the
Laws, 31 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 935, 943 (1982); Charles Garraway, “To
Kill or Not to Kill?”—Dilemmas on the Use of Force, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY
LAW 499 (2009).
134. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK UNDER ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL I (2009); WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 77–116 (2012).
135. The dual character of the law is reflected in the traditional distinction between
the rules relating to the protection of the victims of war, known as “Geneva law,” and the
rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, known as “Hague law.” See François Bugnion,
Droit de Genève et Droit de La Haye, 83 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 901
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portant features that distinguish it from international human rights law.
Not all the rules of the law of armed conflict are humanitarian in their
nature or origin.136 As is well known, at the heart of the law of armed conflict lies a balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations.137 Whereas international human rights law confers rights and fundamental freedoms on every person without distinction and discrimination,
the level of protection offered by the law of armed conflict to an individual
depends on his or her legal status on the battlefield.138 By stipulating that
attacks may only be directed against military objectives, the law of armed
conflict gives effect to humanitarian imperatives through shielding civilians
and civilian objects from hostilities.139 However, in the same breath, it also
recognizes that the use of combat power against combatants and military
objects is permissible on the basis of their status as military objectives.140
Status-based detention in armed conflict is therefore perfectly compatible
with the humanitarian aspirations of the law of armed conflict.
(2001). With the adoption of AP I, these two strands of the law have become even more
closely intertwined. See Richard J. Erickson, Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and Geneva Law
of Armed Conflict, 19 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 557 (1979); Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 75. However, this does not mean that “Hague law” has been superseded or abandoned.
136. G.I.A.D. Draper, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, ACTA JURIDICA 193, 199–
201 (1979).
137. E.g., G.I.A.D. Draper, Military Necessity and Humanitarian Imperatives, 12 MILITARY
LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW 129 (1973); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 4–6 (2d ed. 2010);
Schmitt, supra note 23; Mary Ellen O’Connell, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 34–36 (Dieter Fleck ed., 3d ed.
2013). Cf. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 2.4.1 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT].
138. See Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: The
Politics of Distinction, 19 MICHIGAN STATE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2011).
On the status of individuals on the battlefield, see SOLIS, supra note 21, at 186–239. While
the law of armed conflict thus discriminates between individuals based on their battlefield
status, it does not discriminate between individuals enjoying the same status. See Jelena
Pejic, Non-discrimination and Armed Conflict, 83 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 183 (2001).
139. See David Kretzmer, Civilian Immunity in War: Legal Aspects, in CIVILIAN IMMUNITY IN WAR 84 (Igor Primoratz ed., 2007).
140. BOOTHBY, supra note 134, at 60 (“The law of armed conflict and the customary
law of targeting are rooted in the principle that a distinction must be made throughout the
conflict between those who may be lawfully attacked and those who must be respected
and protected.”).
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Unlike human rights law, the law of armed conflict does not merely
impose obligations on States. It has occasionally been suggested that this
branch of international law is prohibitive, not permissive, in nature. According to this view, the law of armed conflict constitutes an elaborate set
of rules crafted for the purpose of prohibiting the excesses of war by establishing a minimum level of humanitarian protection, without, however,
providing any affirmative authorization to engage in warfighting.141 It is
difficult to reconcile this position with the permissive language found in
various rules of the law of armed conflict, such as Article 22 of the Hague
Regulations142 or Article 21 of the Third Geneva Convention.143 More fundamentally, such a view fails to appreciate the role that the principle of military necessity plays in the law of armed conflict. As Nils Melzer has explained, the “aim of military necessity as a principle of law has always been
to provide a realistic standard of conduct by permitting those measures of
warfare that are reasonably required for the effective conduct of hostilities,
while at the same time prohibiting the infliction of unnecessary suffering,
injury and destruction.”144 The principle therefore serves both a restrictive
and a permissive function at the same time. The permissive function was
expressed by the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the Hostages case as follows:
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In
general, it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the
safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations. It permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other persons whose
destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed conflicts of the war;

141. Derek Jinks, International Human Rights Law in Time of Armed Conflict, in THE OXHANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 656, 666–69 (Andrew
Clapham & Paola Gaeta eds., 2014).
142. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 22, annexed
to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 (“The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” (emphasis added)).
143. Supra note 122. In Hassan, the European Court accepted that the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions confer “powers” upon State parties to an international armed
conflict. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 105.
144. MELZER, supra note 118, at 279–80.
FORD
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it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger.145

As a general principle, military necessity it is not sufficiently precise to
provide detailed guidance on what are permissible aims, means and methods of warfare, and what are not. Rather, it falls to the positive rules of the
law of armed conflict, as laid down in the applicable treaties and embodied
in customary international law, to provide that guidance and thereby give
military necessity concrete meaning. Military necessity therefore operates as
a background principle, woven into the fabric of the law of armed conflict
in two main ways. First, it maintains a degree of flexibility in the application
of the law by serving as an express exception to specific rules. 146 Second,
and more importantly for our purposes, military necessity feeds into the
creation of positive rules as a permissive principle.147 Many, though not
necessarily all, prohibitions of the law of armed conflict contain as their
flipside varying degrees of permissions.148 To assume that everything which
is not expressly prohibited in the law of armed conflict is permissible does
not quite capture the complex interplay between humanitarian considerations and military necessity.149 However, in some cases, permissions are in
fact implied in the law, even though they may not be stated expressly.150 As
we saw, the duty of distinction channels lawful violence, exposing military
objectives to attack while shielding civilians.151 This permissive element of
the duty of distinction is confirmed by the longstanding, consistent and
general practice of States of exercising their liberty to conduct status-based
operations against enemy military objectives within the limits laid down by
145. United States v. Wilhelm List and Others (The Hostages Case), 8 LAW REPORTS
34, 66 (1949). See also William Gerald Downey Jr., The Law
of War and Military Necessity, 47 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (1953).
146. Cf. AP I, supra note 2, art. 51(3). See Emily Camins, The Past as Prologue: The Development of the “Direct Participation” Exception to Civilian Immunity, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
OF THE RED CROSS 853 (2008). For other examples, see Hillaire McCoubrey, The Nature of
the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity, 30 MILITARY LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR REVIEW
215, 229–37 (1991).
147. Nobuo Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative Indifference, 44 GEORGETOWN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 675, 717–18 (2013).
148. Id. at 737–49; Corn, supra note 22, at 92.
149. As a principle of law, military necessity is not some form of extra-legal freedom.
Cf. McCoubrey, supra note 146, at 219–21. On different constructions of the term, see
Nobuo Hayashi, Contextualizing Military Necessity, 27 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 190 (2013).
150. Id. at 234–35; Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative Indifference, supra note 147, at
747–48.
151. Berman, supra note 125, at 5.
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
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the law of armed conflict. Once again, these points underline that an implied authorization for detention in NIACs may well exist in rules of the
law of armed conflict other than CA3 and AP II.
4. Principle of Equal Application
Leggatt J held that recognizing a legal basis for detention in AP II would
have entailed extending that authority to dissident and rebel armed groups
as well, which surely could not have been intended.152 This stretches the
principle of the equal application of the law of armed conflict too far. 153
The States negotiating the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols resisted creating the impression that they were recognizing
any belligerent rights for non-State actors or conferring a belligerent status
on them. In fact, CA3 explicitly states that its application “shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.” As the commentary on CA3
explains, the inclusion of this clause was essential to secure its adoption by
the negotiating States.154 The language, structure and negotiating history of
CA3 and AP II thus demonstrate that States were not prepared to accord
the same belligerent status and rights to non-State actors which they themselves enjoyed.
This can mean only one of two things for the principle of equal application. First, if the principle demands that all belligerents must enjoy the
same status and rights and CA3 does not confer the full panoply of belligerent status and rights on non-State actors, then the only logical conclusion
is that the parties to the Geneva Conventions and AP II gave up their status and rights as States and assumed the same status and rights as non-State
actors. This not only contradicts commonsense, but also the plain language
of CA3, which declares that it does not affect the legal status of the parties,
State and non-State alike, to the conflict. In fact, CA3 thereby conserves
any pre-existing inequality between the belligerent status and rights of State
and non-State parties to a NIAC. This compels us to adopt a second, nar152. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 245.
153. On the principle, see Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A
Principle under Pressure, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 931 (2008); Adam
Roberts, The Principle of Equal Application of the Laws of War, in JUST AND UNJUST WARRIORS: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF SOLDIERS 226 (David Rodin & Henry Shue
eds., 2008).
154. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 126, at 44. See also
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 4499.
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rower reading of the principle of equality: namely, that CA3 and AP II provide for equality of protection, but not equality of belligerent status and rights,
between the State and non-State parties to a NIAC.155 Accordingly, the fact
that CA3 and AP II do not contain an express legal basis for detention
does not prove that States do not enjoy the authority to detain persons in
NIACs, nor does the express or implicit existence of such a right for States
require them, in logic or in law, to extend the same right to non-State actors.
5. Lack of Procedural Safeguards
Finally, Leggatt J held that in the absence of detailed rules governing “who
may be detained, on what grounds, in accordance with what procedures or
for how long,” CA3 and AP II could not possibly have been intended to
provide for a power to detain.156 Two points are worth noting in this respect.
First, just because the law of armed conflict does not regulate the exercise of a particular power in great detail does not mean that it does not recognize the existence of that power at all. Consider the rule in Article 51(3)
of AP I, whereby civilians enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military operations and may not be the object of attack “unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”157 AP I does not
provide any further guidance as to what direct participation in hostilities
entails, when exactly it commences and ceases, or how and through what
procedure an act of direct participation should be identified.158 Yet this lack
of guidance does not prevent Article 51(3) from rendering such civilians
155. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 4458 (“in a
non-international armed conflict the legal status of the parties involved in the struggle is
fundamentally unequal”); Berman, supra note 125, at 20, describes this as the “statist and
governmentalist biases” of the law of armed conflict.
156. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 246. It
should be emphasized that the gap is mainly procedural. The rules governing the treatment of detainees are much more robust. See CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 78–117.
157. See Camins, supra note 146.
158. On some of these questions, see Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized
Armed Groups and the ICRC Direct Participation in Hostilities Interpretive Guidance, 42 NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 641 (2010); Michael
N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements, id. at 697;
Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities,
id. at 741.
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liable to lethal attack.
Second, such regulatory gaps are often filled by other rules of law or by
authoritative guidance.159 This is not the place to study the rules of international law governing the conditions of deprivation of liberty in a NIAC. It
suffices to note that they include other rules of the law of armed conflict,160
rules of international human rights law161 and relevant non-binding instruments.162 Although these additional rules may not resolve all questions with
absolutely certainty,163 they do go a long way towards providing a detailed
legal framework for detention in NIACs. In the light of these points, Leggatt J’s conclusion that the absence of detailed procedural rules in CA3 and
AP II “confirms that it is not the purpose of these provisions to establish a
legal basis for detention” is not persuasive. Nor does the absence of such
159. In the case of Article 51(3) of AP I, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE
RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE].
160. E.g., rules defining the temporal scope of application of a NIAC. See SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 252–54. Or rules imported from the law of armed conflict applicable in international armed conflicts by analogy. See, e.g., Knut Dörmann, Detention in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 347, 356 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies). See also Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and
Safeguards for Internment /Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 375 (2005).
161. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 347–52 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). See also U.N. Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of Person, ¶ 66 (advance unedited version), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, available at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/
_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGC%2f35&Lan
g=en; CRAWFORD, supra note 125, at 118–52.
162. E.g., The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations: Principles and Guidelines (2012), reprinted in 51 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS
1368 (2012), available at http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Pol
itics-and-diplomacy/Copenhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf;
International Committee of the Red Cross, Strengthening Legal Protection for Persons deprived of
their Liberty in relation to Non-International Armed Conflict (Regional Consultations 2012–13
Background Paper), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2013/streng thening-legal-protection-detention-consultations-2012-2013-icrc.pdf.
163. See John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (2011); John B. Bellinger III, Legal Issues Related to Armed Conflict with Non-state Groups, in PRISONERS IN WAR 251 (Sibylle Scheipers
ed., 2010).
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procedural rules exclude the possibility that there might be an alternative
source for such a legal basis.
B. Lethal Targeting and Detention in NIACs
In the previous Section we have shown that neither the terms nor the purpose of CA3 and AP II are incompatible with the existence of a legal authority to detain persons in a NIAC based on their battlefield status. Although the language of CA3 and AP II suggests that these rules do not
themselves provide an implicit legal basis for detention, in the light of the
considerations set out in the previous Section, it is reasonable to read them
as being based on an assumption that some implied authority to detain in
NIACs does exist. However, at this point some may object that the foregoing considerations, although applicable and well-established in the case of
international armed conflicts, do not apply with the same force to NIACs.164 Of course, the legal framework governing the two types of armed
conflicts is different. It is widely acknowledged, for example, that human
rights considerations may apply with greater urgency in NIACs.165 As the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has observed in the La
Tablada case, it is “during situations of internal armed conflict” that international human rights law and the law of armed conflict “most converge and
reinforce each other.”166 Notwithstanding these and other differences between international and non-international armed conflicts, the key point for
164. E.g., Peter Rowe, Is there a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a
Non-International Armed Conflict?, 61 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 697, 701–2 (2012). Ryan Goodman has argued that “if States have authority to engage
in particular practices in an international armed conflict (e.g., targeting direct participants
in hostilities), they a fortiori possess the authority to undertake those practices in noninternational conflict.” Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 50 (2009). Bearing in mind the different character and trajectories of international and non-international armed conflicts, such
a broad analogy goes too far. The authority to undertake particular practices in a NIAC
cannot be derived from the corresponding authority available in international armed conflict by simple analogy. Rather, it must be derived from the regulation of the particular
practice in question by the law of armed conflict applicable in NIACs, as we do in the
present section.
165. E.g., Draper, supra note 136, at 205; Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A
Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 34 (2004); Garraway, supra note 133, at 503.
166. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Amer. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 ¶ 160 (1997).
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our purposes is that the principle of military necessity underlies the law of
armed conflict applicable in both types of conflicts. This can be illustrated
from two perspectives.
1. Military Necessity in NIACs
International human rights law recognizes that the right to life is not absolute, but subject to certain exceptions. Under Article 2(2)(c) of the ECHR
the deprivation of life is not unlawful when it results from the use of force
which is no more than absolutely necessary “in action lawfully taken for the
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.” Although the use of lethal force
pursuant to this provision remains tied to the law enforcement standard of
“absolute necessity,” critically, it implies that quelling a riot or insurrection
constitutes a legitimate aim for the use of force by the Contracting Parties.167 Once the violence reaches the requisite level of intensity and organization,168 the rules of the law of armed conflict in NIAC become applicable
to the situation.169 There is no reason why the use of lethal force for the

167. Stewart v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10044/82, 39 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 162, ¶ 27 (1984); Güleç v. Turkey, App. No. 21593/93, 28 E.H.R.R. 121, ¶ 71 (1998);
Finogenov and Others v. Russia, App. Nos 18299/03, 27311/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 218
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108231#{"itemid":
["001-108231"]}. See LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT
AND TERRORISM 169–71 (2011); DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 232–33 (3d ed. 2014).
168. Concerning this threshold, see SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 164–210;
YORAM DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
37–57 (2014). For a human rights-based argument in favor of a higher threshold of application de lege ferenda, see David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 8 (2009).
169. Annyssa Bellal & Louise Doswald-Beck, Evaluating the Use of Force During the Arab
Spring, 14 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3, 32 (2011). The law of
armed conflict becomes applicable regardless of which party has caused the escalation in
violence. However, as a matter of international human rights law, a State may not take
measures which unilaterally escalate the violence to the level of a non-international armed
conflict, as this would by definition amount to an unnecessary and disproportionate use of
lethal force. In other words, the right to quell a riot or insurrection does not permit States
to unilaterally create an armed conflict. See id. at 19. Indeed, measures taken to quell a riot
must be aimed at “calming the violent behaviour” of the demonstrators. Solomou v. Turkey, App. No. 36832/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 78 (2008). See also Isaak v. Turkey, App. No.
44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 118 (2008). It has therefore been suggested that international
human rights establishes a jus ad bellum of sorts for internal armed conflicts. See ELIAV
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purposes of quelling the insurrection should suddenly cease to be a legitimate aim.170 On the contrary, since the applicability of the law of armed
conflict is triggered by an escalation of the level of violence, there is every
reason to believe that the use of lethal force is now more, rather than less,
necessary from the perspective of Article 2(2). If the ECHR admits that the
use of lethal force is, in principle, necessary and legitimate in such circumstances, it is difficult to see why the law of armed conflict applicable in
NIACs should not do likewise and give effect to this according to its own
rules.171 This point is supported by the fact that the principle of military
necessity reflects “the sovereign right of a State to take measures in the defence of its vital interests.”172 Although there is no single rule codifying a
State’s right to use armed force in self-defense in its internal affairs,173 international law recognizes that States do have a fundamental right to survival.174 In so far as this right permits the use of force to ensure the State’s
survival against internal threats,175 we should expect to see it reflected in the
rules of the law of armed conflict governing the conduct of hostilities in
NIACs.
In fact, these rules, in particular the rules governing targeting, confirm
that the permissive dimension of the principle of military necessity applies
in NIACs. In recent years, the convergence between international human
LIEBLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CIVIL WARS: INTERVENTION AND CONSENT 156–
57 (2013).
170. Cf. William A. Schabas, The Right to Life, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 141, at 365, 385.
171. Accordingly, with the applicability of the law of armed conflict (see supra note
169), the State in question now may quell the riot or insurrection pursuant to the conduct
of hostilities paradigm. See Melzer, supra note 118, 243–99.
172. McCoubrey, supra note 146, at 217.
173. The inherent right of individual and collective self-defense recognized by Article
51 of the UN Charter is available to States only in their international relations, meaning
that the armed attack triggering the right of self-defense must be of an international character. As such, it is not available against purely internal attacks which do not entail the
involvement of external actors. See TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF
THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 368–510 (2010).
174. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 95. Cf. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 41–44 (1963).
175. It is generally admitted that States enjoy the right to put down a rebellion or insurgency. See, e.g., COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 126, at 36;
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 60 (2002); OLIVIER CORTEN,
THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 127–29 (2010); DINSTEIN, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 168, at 5.
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rights law and the law of armed conflict has been accompanied by a growing convergence between the two branches of the law of armed conflict
applicable in international and non-international armed conflicts.176 The
two processes are in fact related.177 In Tadić, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia identified the development of human
rights doctrines as one of the factors driving the extension of the rules and
principles of the law of armed conflict designed for international armed
conflicts into the sphere of non-international armed conflicts.178 According
to the Tribunal, customary rules analogous to those applicable in international armed conflict have developed to govern NIACs in such areas as the
protection of civilians from hostilities and the prohibition of certain means
and methods of warfare.179 Indeed, convergence extends to targeting.
Neither CA3 nor AP II accord immunity from attack to persons who
directly or actively participate in hostilities.180 Bearing in mind the dual
character of the law of armed conflict, the reason for this lack of protection
is, quite obviously, that such persons are treated as legitimate objectives of
attack. However, as in the case of detention, the difficulty is that neither
CA3 nor AP II confers an explicit right on States to attack insurgent fighters and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Nonetheless, their language suggests that such a right was implied by the drafters. First, AP II
distinguishes between “persons” who benefit from fundamental guarantees
under Article 4 and “civilians” who enjoy general protection against the
dangers arising from military operations under Article 13. Since the concept of a “person” is broader than the concept of a “civilian,” the natural
meaning of these words suggests that “persons” include civilians and noncivilians, that is, fighters. Second, Article 4(1) affords fundamental guarantees to two groups: “persons who do not take a direct part” in hostilities
and persons “who have ceased to take part in hostilities.” The first group
can only refer to innocent civilians who have not taken up arms since
176. See Emily Crawford, Blurring the Lines between International and Non-International
Armed Conflicts: The Evolution of Customary International Law Applicable in Internal Armed Conflicts, 15 AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 29 (2008); DINSTEIN, NONINTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 168, at 211–19.
177. Cf. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 99.
178. Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra note 66, ¶ 97.
179. Id., ¶ 127.
180. Only “[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities” benefit from the protections afforded by CA3(1), while Article 4(1) of AP II limits the fundamental guarantees set
out in that provision to “persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take
part in hostilities.”
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fighters by definition take a direct part in hostilities. The second group
must therefore logically refer to civilians who have ceased to take a direct
part in hostilities and to fighters who are hors de combat.181 Two points follow from this. Insurgent fighters are not civilians and do not become civilians upon ceasing to take part in hostilities; otherwise the word “persons”
would not have been used in preference of “civilians.” Fighters do not
benefit from fundamental guarantees unless they have ceased to take part
in hostilities by becoming hors de combat. In this respect, AP II mirrors the
treatment of combatants in international armed conflict.
Even if this textual interpretation is not considered conclusive, it is
hardly conceivable, reading the relevant provisions against their context,182
that the drafters of CA3 and AP II meant to treat everyone in a NIAC as a
civilian and did not foresee the status-based targeting of insurgent fighters.183 As the commentary on CA3 notes, “it must be recognized that the
181. Both of these points are confirmed by the negotiating history of AP II. Part II of
the draft text prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which served as
the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of AP II, dealt
with the humane treatment of persons in the power of the parties to the conflict. Draft
Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 1973, in 1 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS pt. III
(1978). Article 6 of the draft set out the fundamental guarantees which eventually became
Article 4 of AP II. Article 7 of the draft afforded various protections to enemy hors de combat “in accordance with Article 6.” The relationship between Articles 6 and 7 and subsequent discussion during the drafting process confirm that the word “persons” used in
Article 6 was intended to include enemy fighters. See 8 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 323–24, 332, 336
(1978). Article 7 of the draft (which during the negotiations became Article 22bis) was
eventually deleted. However, it was recognized that enemy personnel hors de combat were
still covered by the fundamental guarantees in Article 6 of the draft. See id. at 335; 4 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS ix (1978)).
182. In line with the general rule of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Article 31(1)–(2), the terms of CA3 and AP II must be interpreted
in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and AP II, respectively.
183. Treating everyone as a civilian in NIACs would render the principle of distinction meaningless and inoperable. Marco Sassòli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship between
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
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conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities—conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of
a single country.”184 In fact, the commentary to AP II observes that members of organized armed groups “may be attacked at any time.”185 Similarly,
in the La Tablada case, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
recognized that
when civilians, such as those who attacked the Tablada base, assume the
role of combatants by directly taking part in fighting, whether singly or as
a member of a group, they thereby become legitimate military targets. As
such, they are subject to direct individualized attack to the same extent as
combatants. . . . When they attacked the La Tablada base, those persons involved clearly assumed the risk of a military response by the State.186

Meanwhile, the principal rules of the law of armed conflict governing
targeting in international armed conflicts have passed into customary international law so as to now govern targeting in NIACs.187 Underlying this
development is, first, the notion that members of organized armed groups
and civilians directly participating in hostilities are fighters and, second, that
such persons constitute legitimate military objectives.188 In line with the
principle of distinction, attacks may only be directed against such persons.
As the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law issued by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) illustrates,189 the interplay between humanity and military necessity channels the use of lethal force in the same way in NIACs as
RED CROSS 599, 607 (2008). See also Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Two Sides of the Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 33 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
313, 329–30 (2011).
184. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV, supra note 126, at 36 (emphasis
added).
185. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 126, ¶ 4789.
186. Abella v. Argentina, supra note 166, ¶¶ 178–79 (emphasis in original).
187. SIVAKUMARAN, supra note 124, at 336–86; BOOTHBY, supra note 134, at 440–50.
Cf. UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 137, ¶¶ 15.6, 15.9.1.
188. Both points are now well-established in State practice, as reflected in authoritative restatements of the law. E.g., 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
supra note 161, pt. I; MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H. B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH
COMMENTARY rr. 1.1.2, 2.1.1 (2006), available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/
NIACManualIYBHR15th.pdf.
189. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159.
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it does in international armed conflicts: it shelters civilians and those who
are hors de combat from the adverse effects of war and permits States to conduct attacks against combatants/fighters and civilians directly participating
in hostilities.190 The caselaw of the European Court of Human Rights confirms this conclusion. In Korbely, the Court accepted that, from the perspective of CA3, the leader of an armed group of insurgents who has not laid
down his arms or otherwise expressed his clear intention to surrender must
be considered as taking an active part in hostilities and therefore constitutes
a combatant subject to attack.191
2. An Inherent Right to Detain
So far we have established that the principle of military necessity applies in
NIACs and permits States to use lethal force to conduct hostilities. These
points are critical in the present context. This is so because, as we have indicated earlier, the government submitted “that the ability to detain insurgents, whilst hostilities are ongoing, is an essential corollary of the authorisation to kill them.”192 Leggatt J rejected this argument for the following
reason:
This argument justifies the capture of a person who may lawfully be
killed. But it does not go further than that.193 It therefore does not begin
to justify the detention policy operated by the UK in Afghanistan. In
terms of the present case, the argument would justify the arrest of [Serdar
Mohammed] on the assumed facts, in circumstances where he was believed to represent an imminent threat. However, as soon as he had been
detained and the use of lethal force against him could not be justified, the
argument no longer provides a basis for his detention.194

190. Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan,
in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 307, 308 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
2009) (Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies); Corn & Jenks, supra
note 183, at 325; Dieter Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 137, at 581, 595.
191. Korbely v. Hungary, App. No. 9174/02, 50 E.H.R.R. 48, ¶¶ 89–94 (2010).
Although in this case the Court was concerned with the principle that there can be no
punishment without law as recognized by Article 7 of the ECHR, rather than the right to
life pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, this makes no difference with regard to its
findings concerning CA3.
192. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 252.
193. At this point, the judgment refers to DEBUF, supra note 127, at 389.
194. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 253.
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The logic of this argument is impeccable. If the authority to detain derives from the authority to kill—on the basis that the right to deprive a
person of his life must imply the right to inflict the lesser evil to detain him:
a maiore ad minus—it follows that detention cannot be permissible in broader circumstances than those governing killing. If killing is not permissible,
then neither is detention. Where Leggatt J errs, with respect, is not the logic
of the argument, but its opening premise. The law of armed conflict authorizes States to attack two groups of persons: civilians directly participating in hostilities and members of organized armed groups carrying out a
continuous combat function. The justification and conditions for attack
differ in these two cases, as do the conditions governing their detention.195
As regards the first group, CA3 and Article 13(3) of AP II stipulate that
civilians lose their immunity from attack for such time as they are directly
participating in hostilities. According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance to
qualify as direct participation in hostilities, an act must satisfy three cumulative criteria,196 known as the threshold of harm,197 direct causation198 and
belligerent nexus.199 The details need not detain us here, except that the
threshold of harm refers to harm of a “specifically military nature,” such as
acts of sabotage.200 In contrast to the human rights standards on which
Leggatt J seems to rely in the passage quoted above, CA3 and Article 13(3)
therefore permit a person to be lawfully killed even where he or she does
195. Leggatt J’s reasoning closely follows that of DEBUF, supra note 127. Debuf denies
that there is an inherent right to intern in NIACs. Id. at 464–86. She argues that the authority to target civilians directly participating in hostilities does not include an authority to
intern them after capture since at that point they will have regained their immunity from
attack. Id. at 389. Although this is correct, she fails to consider that different considerations apply to persons carrying out a continuous combat function since such persons are
not civilians. See infra notes 202–8 and accompanying text.
196. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159, at 46–64.
197. “In order to reach the required threshold of harm, a specific act must be likely to
adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict
or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected
against direct attack.” Id. at 47.
198. “In order for the requirement of direct causation to be satisfied, there must be a
direct causal link between a specific act and the harm likely to result either from that act,
or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.” Id.
at 51.
199. “In order to meet the requirement of belligerent nexus, an act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the
conflict and to the detriment of another.” Id. at 58.
200. Id. at 47.
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not present an “imminent threat” to life. Because such persons are civilians, they are subject to attack only for the limited period that they are actively engaged in hostilities.201 Once they discontinue their direct engagement for whatever reason, their temporary legal exposure to targeting
comes to an end and their underlying immunity from attack is fully restored.202 Consequently, if the direct participation of a civilian in hostilities
comes to an effective end with his capture, he may no longer be subject to
attack. As Leggatt J correctly recognized, if he may not be killed, he may
not be detained on this basis either.
The second group of persons consists of members of organized armed
groups who carry out a continuous combat function. As the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance explains, organized armed groups are the armed forces, in a
functional sense, of a non-State party to a NIAC.203 Since membership in
insurgent forces has no basis in domestic law, the ICRC’s position is that
“membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed
by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a
whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to
the conflict.”204 Such a continuous combat function “requires lasting integration into an organized armed group.” For this reason, persons carrying
out a continuous combat function cease to be civilians for as long as they
remain members in the organized armed group by virtue of their continuous combat function.205 During this time, they are legitimate military objectives and may be targeted on the basis of their status alone, irrespective of
whether they pose an imminent threat or not, just like combatant members
of a State’s armed forces. The capture of a person carrying out a continuous combat function does not, in itself, sever his lasting integration into the
organized armed group to which he belongs.206 Accordingly, he does not
201. Id. at 70–71. This leads to a so-called “revolving door” of civilian protection,
which has received considerable critical comment. E.g., Boothby, supra note 158, at 753–
58; Watkin, supra note 158, at 686–90.
202. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159, at 71.
203. Id. at 32.
204. Id. at 33.
205. Id. at 71. See also id. at 27–28.
206. According to the Interpretive Guidance, membership in an organized armed group
on grounds of a continuous combat function ceases when the person disengages from
carrying out such a function by means of conclusive behavior to this effect. See id. at 72.
What constitutes such conclusive behavior is a matter of debate. See Boothby, supra note
158, at 759–61. However, disengagement clearly requires more than a temporary lapse or
inability in carrying out the continuous combat function. Otherwise there would be little
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become a civilian merely by virtue of his capture.207 He remains a fighter
subject, in principle, to direct attack for as long as his membership in the
organized armed group continues. However, the authority to attack him is
merely suspended during his detention, for persons who are hors de combat
may not be made the subject of attack.208 The authority revives, however,
as soon as he is no longer hors de combat, engages in hostile acts against his
captors or attempts to escape.209 Consequently, the authority to kill persists
for as long as membership in the organized armed group persists, although
that authority is suspended following capture and during detention. Contrary to Leggatt J’s finding, the detaining State’s continued authority to kill
a person carrying out a continuous combat function is therefore capable of
serving as a legal basis for its authority to detain him.
We should emphasize that humanitarian and operational considerations
equally compel this conclusion. The authority to attack and the authority to
detain are functionally linked. As in the case of combatants in an international armed conflict,210 the internment of members of organized armed
groups carrying out a continuous combat function is authorized to prevent
them from returning to the battlefield in lieu of killing them.211 Detention
thus gives effect to the principle of humanity: it is the lesser evil. However,
a decision to detain also reflects military considerations. From an operational perspective, killing every single insurgent may not be necessary and,
in fact, may well be counter-productive. Detention is often preferable to
attack, since it permits the detaining State to gather intelligence and is more
conducive to political reconciliation at the end of the conflict. Denying
States engaged in a NIAC the authority to detain persons who carry out a
continuous combat function for preventative reasons would frustrate these
humanitarian and operational considerations. It would also have meant, for
example in Afghanistan, that such persons could not be detained for more
than 96 hours, but could be killed, in principle, immediately upon their reto distinguish civilians participating directly in hostilities on a “revolving door” basis from
fighters carrying out a continuous combat function and, therefore, between conduct-based
and status-based distinction. See Corn & Jenks, supra note 183, at 341–44, passim. See also
BOOTHBY, supra note 134, at 162.
207. Cf. MOIR, supra note 175, at 60.
208. This, of course, is stipulated in express terms in CA3. It also reflects customary
international law. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note
161, r. 47.
209. Id.
210. DEBUF, supra note 127, at 228–30.
211. Berman, supra note 125, at 9–10.
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lease from that short period of detention. This is utterly absurd—and it is
not what the law requires.
Moreover, detention is accepted and well-established in NIACs as a
matter of State practice. In this respect, Leggatt J seems to have underestimated the significance of the Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines.212 These principles involve a multilateral attempt to formulate standards governing the treatment of individuals detained in NIACs. Importantly, the principles refer to the practice of detention on security grounds.
Leggatt J held that this was of no weight, noting that the commentary explicitly states that the principles “cannot constitute a legal basis for detention.”213 Indeed, the participating States neither intended to create any new
authorizations nor purported to recognize any practice as reflective of customary law.214 This choice is readily understandable, for it reflects the imperative of not bestowing status or legitimacy upon belligerent non-State
actors. Crucially, however, the principles do not exclude the possibility that
such a legal basis already exists under international law.215 In fact, the
“[p]articipants recognised that detention is a necessary, lawful and legitimate means of achieving the objectives of international military operations.”216
The terms, purpose and tone of the principles all suggest that the participating States proceeded on the assumption that an authorization to detain exists in international law. In this respect, it is important to note that
the ICRC has recently expressed disagreement with Mohammed and endorsed the existence of a legal basis for status-based operations in NIACs:
The fact that Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions neither expressly mentions internment, nor elaborates on permissible grounds or
process, has become a source of different positions on the legal basis for
internment by States in an extraterritorial NIAC. One view is that a legal
basis for internment would have to be explicit, as it is in the Fourth Geneva Convention; in the absence of such a rule, IHL cannot provide it

212. Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, supra note 162. See Thomas Winkler,
The Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A Necessity, 78 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 489 (2009); Bruce “Ossie” Oswald & Thomas Winkler, The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, 83 NORDIC
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (2014).
213. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 264–66.
214. Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines, supra note 162, cmt. ¶ 16.2.
215. Id., princ. 16.
216. Id., ¶ III.
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implicitly.217 Another view, shared by the ICRC, is that both customary
and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC. This position is based on the fact that internment is a form of deprivation of liberty which is a common occurrence in armed conflict, not prohibited by
Common Article 3, and that Additional Protocol II—which has been ratified by 167 States—refers explicitly to internment.218

Finally, it is useful to recall that, according to information received by
the Ministry of Defence, Mr. Mohammed was a senior Taliban commander.219 If correct, it seems likely that he qualified as an individual carrying out
a continuous combat function. According to the Interpretive Guidance, “individuals whose continuous function involves the . . . command of acts or
operations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming a
continuous combat function.”220 His detention by UK forces was therefore
authorized under the law of armed conflict for such time as his membership in the organized armed group to which he belonged continued.221 As
we have shown, the legal basis for status-based detention is both implicit in
the scheme of CA3 and AP II, as a necessary corollary of the implicit authority to kill, and founded in customary law.
C. Lex Specialis
The final question that remains to be considered is whether the UK’s authority to detain Mr. Mohammed under the law of armed conflict prevails
over the conflicting obligation imposed on it by Article 5 of the ECHR.
Before turning to Leggatt J’s reasons for denying that any authority to de217. At this point, the Opinion Paper cites Mohammed, supra note 16.
218. International Committee of the Red Cross, Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules
and Challenges (Opinion Paper, Nov. 2014), available at https://www.icrc.org/en/ download/file/1980/security-detention-position-paper-icrc-11-2014.pdf. See also Jelena Pejic &
Cordula Droege, The Legal Regime Governing Treatment and Procedural Guarantees for Persons
Detained in the Fight against Terrorism, in COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: MEETING THE CHALLENGES 527, 552–53 (Larissa van den Herik & Nico Schrijver eds., 2013).
219. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 10.
220. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 159, at 34.
221. It should be clear from the foregoing analysis, but is worth underlining that the
authority to detain in NIAC is limited: not every individual taking up arms in the so-called
“war on terror” may be detained on this basis. See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a
Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1169 (2011).
A determination must be made on the facts of each individual case.
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tain prevailed, it is useful to make a few more general points.
1. Norm Conflict: Real or Apparent?
In the present case, a normative conflict exists between the rules of the law
of armed conflict and the European Convention. The law of armed conflict
authorized the UK to detain Mr. Mohammed for preventative reasons on
the basis of his membership in an organized armed group. However, Article 5(1) of the European Convention stipulates that no one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the five exceptional circumstances listed in
subparagraphs (a) to (f).
As the European Court explained in Hassan, none of these permissible
grounds of detention covers interment and preventative detention where
there is no intention to bring criminal charges within a reasonable period of
time.222 In fact, the Court took the firm view that detention of the kind
foreseen under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions is not congruent with any of the exceptions set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f).223 Notwithstanding the Court’s position, it may be thought that there is no real
conflict between these norms at all. The law of armed conflict merely permits internment and preventative detention without actually imposing a
duty on States to make use of it. The conflict between the two norms is
therefore only an apparent one since it can be resolved quite easily by the
States concerned themselves: they merely have to refrain from exercising
their authority to intern in favor of the prohibition contained in Article 5 of
the Convention. Indeed, this is what the European Court seemed to imply
in Al-Jedda.224 However, this is not an attractive approach.
First, it would bring about the complete humanization of the rules governing the conduct of warfare. The law of armed conflict imposes an extensive set of obligations on States, and also grants them certain authorizations. However, these authorizations, for example the right to attack or to
intern enemy combatants, are formulated as permissions, not as obligations. No State is bound by the law of armed conflict to engage in statusbased operations. Consequently, if we were to deny that a norm conflict
may arise between authorizations and obligations, States would have to
forego any of the authorizations granted by the law of armed conflict
222. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 97.
223. Id.
224. Al-Jedda, European Court, supra note 12, ¶ 107. Cf. Krieger, supra note 12, at 426–
27.
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where these are inconsistent with their human rights obligations. When
faced with a more permissive and a stricter rule of either international human rights law or the law of armed conflict, the same logic would also
compel States to comply with the stricter rule. As a result, the conduct of
warfare would be governed in its entirety by prohibitions of the most restrictive kind. As we have suggested earlier, this is undesirable as it drives
the convergence between the two legal regimes too far.225 Domestic law is
incapable of reversing this outcome. No State may invoke its domestic law
as a justification for its failure to perform its treaty obligations.226 Consequently, States may not rely on any authorizations to conduct hostilities
granted under their domestic law where such authorizations conflict with
their international human rights obligations.
Second, this restrictive approach is not supported by the law. It is perfectly possible for norm conflicts to arise between authorizations and obligations.227 A norm may authorize a State to engage in a certain conduct,
while a different norm may prohibit it from performing that same conduct.
In such cases, a conflict exists if the authorization is a strong one in the
sense of a Hohfeldian privilege or liberty.228 The hallmark of such liberties
is that the authorization (a permission to do X) is not restricted by a conflicting obligation (a duty to refrain from doing X). It is clear that the permissive aspect of the principle of military necessity confers such Hohfeldian liberties on States party to an armed conflict within the framework of the
law of armed conflict.229
However, do the authorizations granted by the law of armed conflict
also retain their character as Hohfeldian liberties when they meet restrictions imposed by international human rights law? Put differently: do
law of armed conflict authorizations prevail over human rights law obligations? To our mind, international practice suggests that the answer is affirmative. It is now well-established that the relationship between the law
of armed conflict and international human rights law is governed by the lex
225. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
226. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, art. 27. See Kirsten
Schmalenbach, Article 27: Internal Law and Observance of Treaties, in VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 453 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach
eds., 2012).
227. See Erich Vranes, The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and Legal
Theory, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 395 (2006).
228. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL 16, 32–44 (1913).
229. Hayashi, Military Necessity as Normative Indifference, supra note 147, at 684.
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specialis principle.230 Putting aside for a moment the questions surrounding
its meaning and legal effect,231 the widespread reliance on the principle
demonstrates that States and international courts do not take the view that
human rights norms simply override the rules of the law of armed conflict.
As others have shown, international courts try to resolve conflicts between
the two legal regimes through harmonious interpretation and other means,
rather than admit that rule prevails over the other.232
However, where such conflict avoidance is not possible, in particular in
the context of status-based operations,233 we believe that the consistent and
widespread conduct of such operations in contemporary State practice
demonstrates that the conflict is to be resolved in favor of the authorizations contained in the law of armed conflict. If the adoption of the Additional Protocols of 1977 is “proof that a separate set of rules for armed
conflicts is in fact what States want,”234 then the passing into customary
international law of some of their principal provisions regulating the con230. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 25. On the principle generally, see Anja
Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis,
74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (2005); Report of the Study Group of
the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3, Aug.
11, 2006, at 34–64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006).
231. The application of the principle in the present context has not passed without
criticism. See Nancy Prud’homme, Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying a More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 357 (2007); Marko Milanović, The Lost Origins of
Lex Specialis: Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, in THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF ARMED CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Jens
David Ohlin ed., forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463957. According
to Milanović, “[t]he appeal of lex specialis lies in the veneer of antiquity of its Latin formula,
in its apparent formality, simplicity and objectivity. But all it really does is disguise a series
of policy judgments about what outcomes are the most sensible, realistic and practicable in
any given situation.” Id. at 30. Milanović may be right about the veneer of antiquity, but
ultimately it is of little consequence by what name we call the principle. However, to dismiss it as a mere instrument of policy judgment wrongly denies its value as a tool of formal
legal reasoning and means for expressing legal choices made by States.
232. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 237–74 (2003);
Marko Milanović, Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 69, 73 (2009); Marko Milanović,
A Norm Conflict Perspective on the Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 459, 468–70 (2009).
233. See supra note 22.
234. Dietrich Schindler, The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, 19
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 3, 14 (1979).
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duct of hostilities for both international and non-international armed conflicts is proof that the States still want the core distinguishing features of
this set of rules to prevail.
2. Applying the Lex Specialis Principle
Leggatt J took a different view. In response to the government’s submission that Article 5 of the Convention was displaced or qualified through
the operation of the lex specialis principle, he distinguished three different
understandings of the principle—strong, weaker and modest—based on
the varying strength of their intended legal effects.235 The strong version of
lex specialis holds that the law of armed conflict displaces international human rights law in its entirety in times of armed conflict.236 This total displacement thesis does not reflect the prevailing view in international practice237 and was given short shrift by Leggatt J in the present case.238
The modest version suggests that lex specialis should be used as a principle of interpretation. Notwithstanding their structural differences, international humanitarian and human rights law are complementary in many
respects.239 The principle of lex specialis draws on this natural complementarity in an attempt to interpret and apply the two legal regimes in a manner
which renders them mutually reinforcing. In some cases, such an interpretative approach is capable of avoiding norm conflicts. This is how the ICJ
used the principle in its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case. Having noted that the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s life pursuant
to Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) continues to apply, in principle, in times of armed conflict, the
Court declared that “[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life . . .
falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”240 More recently, the UN Human Rights Committee applied the prin235. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶¶ 269–94. See also Milanović, supra note 231, at 24–34.
236. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 274.
237. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 167, at 8.
238. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 277.
239. See Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 310, 340–44
(2007). For a more critical assessment of complementarity, see John Tobin, Seeking Clarity
in Relation to the Principle of Complementarity: Reflections on the Recent Contributions of Some International Bodies, 8 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 356 (2007).
240. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 6, ¶ 25.
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ciple in a similar fashion to declare that “[s]ecurity detention authorized
and regulated by and complying with the law of armed conflict in principle
is not arbitrary” under Article 9 of the Covenant.241 However, this modest
version of the lex specialis principle is of no assistance in the present case. In
contrast to the more compliant language found in the ICCPR, Article 5 of
the ECHR sets out an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for detention
and defines them in exact terms. This leaves virtually no scope for applying
the principle of harmonious interpretation, as Leggatt J found.
The solution may lie with the weaker understanding of lex specialis as a
principle designed to resolve conflicts between two opposing norms by
giving effect to the specific rule over the more general one.242 Applying this
principle to the present case means that the rules of detention designed
specifically for armed conflict would prevail over the generally applicable
provisions of Article 5. However, Leggatt J held that the application of this
version of the lex specialis principle was foreclosed by ECHR Article 15,
which provides States with a tailor-made mechanism to resolve potential
conflicts between the law of armed conflict and the Convention.243 In his
view, “the only way in which the European Court or a national court required to apply Convention rights can hold that IHL prevails over Article 5
is by applying the provisions for derogation contained in the Convention
itself, and not by invoking the principle of lex specialis.”244 In the wake of
European Court’s judgment in Hassan, this position no longer reflects the
law.
In Hassan, the Court conceded a number of significant points. First, it
241. U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra note 161, ¶ 64. However, note that the
Committee draws a distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts. In the former, the procedural rules of the law of armed conflict help to mitigate the
risk of arbitrary detention. In the latter, however, the Committee seems to expect States to
take robust additional procedural steps to prevent arbitrary detention. See id.
242. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 282. Marko Milanović has strongly criticized this version of the principle. In his view, it rests on the unstated assumption “that for any given
situation at any given point in time there is one, and can only be one, expression of State
consent or intent as to how that situation is to be regulated,” yet such an assumption is
unfounded as States are “perfectly capable of assuming contradictory commitments.” Milanović, A Norm Conflict Perspective, supra note 232, at 476. This objection carries some force
if lex specialis were to imply that only one of the competing expressions of State consent is
valid at any one point in time. But nothing compels lex specialis to subscribe to this view.
Rather, the principle provides that one of the equally valid expressions of consent should
prevail over the other.
243. Mohammed, supra note 16, ¶ 284.
244. Id.
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confirmed that the ECHR must be interpreted in harmony with other rules
of international law, including those of the law of armed conflict, and took
note of the ICJ’s caselaw on the subject.245 Second, it accepted the British
government’s contention that the absence of derogations made by a respondent State under Article 15 did not prevent the Court from relying on
the law of armed conflict for the purposes of such harmonious interpretation. Article 15 enables the Contracting Parties to take measures derogating
from their obligations under the Convention in “time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.”246 Earlier cases seemed to
suggest that the Court would not have recourse to the law of armed conflict explicitly and of its own accord unless respondent States made use of
Article 15. In Isayeva,247 for example, the Court assessed Russian military
operations in the Second Chechen War against what it called the “normal
legal background” of peacetime law enforcement.248 In making this assessment in the context of the exceptional circumstances prevailing in Chechnya, the Court drew inspiration from the relevant rules of the law of armed
conflict, in particular those governing precautions in attack.249 At no point,
however, did it rely on these rules expressly, identify their source or address
their relationship with the Convention.250 Third, the Court accepted that
245. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 102. The Court here recalled its early finding in Varnava
and Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90,
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90, 16073/90, 50 E.H.R.R. 21, ¶ 185 (2010), that “Article 2
[of the ECHR] must be interpreted in so far as possible in light of the general principles of
international law, including the rules of international humanitarian law which play an indispensable and universally accepted role in mitigating the savagery and inhumanity of
armed conflict.”
246. See R. St. J. MacDonald, Derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 36 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 225 (1997); Aly Mokhtar, Human Rights Obligations v. Derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 8 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 65 (2004).
247. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 E.H.R.R. 38 (2005). See Peter Rowe,
Non-international Armed Conflict and the European Court of Human Rights: Chechnya from 1999, 4
NEW ZEALAND YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205 (2007). Cf. Al-Jedda, European
Court, supra note 12, ¶ 99.
248. Isayeva, supra note 247, ¶ 191.
249. Id., ¶¶ 172–201.
250. See William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European
Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 741
(2005); Leach, supra note 1, 733–34 (2008); Juliet Chevalier-Watts, Has Human Rights Law
become Lex Specialis for the European Court of Human Rights in Right to Life Cases Arising from
Internal Armed Conflicts?, 14 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 584, 591–94
(2010).
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the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions confer “powers” upon States in
an international armed conflict, including in relation to the detention of
persons for imperative reasons of security.251 Finally, it held that the terms
of Article 5 of the Convention should be “accommodated,” as far as possible, with the power to intern or detain persons under the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions:252
By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by international
humanitarian law and by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the
grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a)
to (f) of [Article 5 of the ECHR] should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians
who pose a risk to security under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.253

These considerations apply with equal force in the present case. First,
the UK’s authority to detain Mr. Mohammed derives from its authority to
expose him to lethal attack. This engages the prohibition of the intentional
deprivation of life under Article 2 of the Convention. As the European
Court held in Varnava, the duty of harmonious interpretation applies to
Article 2 as well.254 Consequently, if Hassan holds that the right to liberty is
qualified by the power to detain in armed conflict; this suggests that the
right to life must be qualified by the power to attack combatants and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Second, in Hassan, the Court carefully limited its judgment to international armed conflicts:
The Court is mindful of the fact that internment in peacetime does not
fall within the scheme of deprivation of liberty governed by Article 5 of
the Convention without the exercise of the power of derogation under
Article 15 (see paragraph 97 above). It can only be in cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features of international humanitarian law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.255

As we have shown, the conduct of status-based operations is an accepted and well-established feature not only of international armed con251. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 105.
252. “Accommodation,” no doubt a carefully chosen term, thus goes beyond harmonious interpretation.
253. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 104.
254. Varnava, supra note 245, ¶ 185.
255. Hassan, supra note 13, ¶ 104.
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flicts, but also of NIACs. Consequently, while the facts and precedential
value of Hassan are limited to international armed conflicts, the underlying
reasoning applies, despite the European Court’s hesitation, to NIACs too.
In fact, as we pointed out earlier, the permissibility of using lethal force to
quell a riot or insurrection is recognized by Article 2(2)(c) of the Convention. Moreover, Article 15(2) of the ECHR specifically permits derogations
from the right to life “in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of
war.” Causing the death of a member of an organized armed group carrying out a continuous combat function is a lawful act of war in accordance
with the CA3, AP II and customary international law. If causing such a
death is a permissible ground for derogation, it must also be a sufficient
ground for accommodating the authority to conduct such a lethal attack, as
well as the implied power to detain the target, with Articles 2 and 5 of the
Convention. Finally, the added benefit of such an approach is that it brings
the interpretation of the European Convention in line with the interpretation of the ICCPR in the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the UN Human
Rights Committee.256
V. CONCLUSION
In Mohammed, the English High Court issued a general challenge to the lawfulness of status-based operations in NIACs under international law. According to the judgment, absent express derogation, the more stringent
standards of international human rights law apply as the sole legal framework. By wrongly applying the law of armed conflict and subverting its
core principles, this conclusion pushes convergence to the point of legal
and operational absurdity. We submit that, contrary to Leggatt J’s understanding, a legal basis for the detention of Mr. Mohammed on security
grounds may be found in Security Council Resolution 1890 and in both
treaty and customary law of armed conflict applicable in NIACs. As regards the latter, the legal authority for status-based detention is implicit in
the scheme of CA3 and AP II, as a necessary corollary of the implicit authority to kill, and found in customary law, as reflected by established practice.
As regards the question of Security Council authorization, which we
examined in Section III, the High Court erred in finding that Article 103 of
the Charter was inapplicable. Its central mistake was to construe ISAF’s
256. Cf. id., ¶ 102.
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mandate too narrowly, through the prism of a law enforcement paradigm.
On its proper construction, taking into account the well-established meaning of the phrase “all necessary measures” and ISAF’s mandate as spelled
out in previous resolutions, Resolution 1890 authorized ISAF to operate
pursuant to a conduct of hostilities paradigm. As a result, ISAF was not
limited to the use of force against individuals representing an imminent
threat. Rather, notwithstanding the absence of specific express authorization, ISAF was permitted to engage in both lethal and non-lethal statusbased operations, including targeting. Leggatt J’s demanding understanding
of the requirement for “clear and explicit” language fails to apply the interpretative principles set down by the ICJ. It pushes the European Court’s
reasoning in Al-Jedda too far by inappropriately seeking to impose more
exacting conditions upon the Security Council’s authorization of force under Chapter VII.
In Section IV, we demonstrated that permission to conduct statusbased operations also exists under the law of armed conflict, both in international and in non-international armed conflicts. Leggatt J, however, overlooked three important principles. First, the insistence on an express basis
for detention and/or detailed safeguards in AP II reflects an overly positivist approach which fails to appreciate the true reason for the paucity of
treaty law applicable in NIAC, and leaves insufficient room for the possibility of a legal basis either implicit in CA3 and AP II or under customary
law. The inability of States to agree on binding rules establishing grounds
or safeguards for status-based operations in NIACs reflects their fear of
impliedly conferring status or legitimacy upon belligerent non-State actors.
However, this does not detract from the fact that the conduct of statusbased operations is an accepted and well-established feature of NIACs. The
Copenhagen principles provide evidence of the practice of extended detention on security grounds.
Second, by ascribing to CA3 and AP II an exclusively humanitarian
purpose, Leggatt J disregarded the equally important counterbalancing
structural principle and legitimate aim of military necessity. This principle,
which reflects international law’s acknowledgment of the State’s fundamental right to survival, permeates the law of armed conflict and also finds
recognition in international human rights law. Practice confirms that the
law relating to targeting in international armed conflict, which gives expression to the means of national survival, applies equally in NIACs. Any analysis of the relationship between human rights law and the law of armed
conflict which fails to address this aspect of convergence is incomplete.
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Third, Leggatt J failed to acknowledge the key distinction between different categories of individuals engaged in hostilities in NIACs on behalf of
non-State actors. An exclusive focus on the law enforcement paradigm and
the equal protection of individuals under human rights law led him to overlook the significance in the law of armed conflict of the enduring status of
members of organized armed groups who carry out a continuous combat
function. States engaged in NIACs are permitted to kill or, as a necessary
corollary, capture and detain such persons for as long as they remain a
member of the group pursuant to either CA3 and AP II or customary international law.
The Mohammed judgment provides a crystal ball through which to assess
the future relationship between international human rights law and the law
of armed conflict according to the total convergence thesis. It paints a bizarre battlefield landscape in which status-based operations in NIACs are
prohibited. This highlights the dangers resulting from a failure to fully appreciate the foundational principles of the law of armed conflict and the
ways in which this branch of law differs from human rights in its structure,
design and objectives. In our view, the authorization to conduct statusbased operations under the customary law of armed conflict applicable in
NIACs prevails, as the lex specialis, over more stringent human rights standards. As the European Court accepted in Hassan, albeit with respect to international armed conflicts, this result is precluded neither by the specificity
of the ECHR’s wording nor by the possibility of derogation. Once it is
recognized that detention and targeting are accepted features of NIACs,
the same reasoning applies with equal force. Mohammed is currently pending
before the Court of Appeal and the case is widely expected to reach the
Supreme Court and perhaps even the European Court. It is to be hoped
that the higher courts will equip themselves with the foundational principles of the law of armed conflict and help move the global convergence
debate onto a more conceptually stable and operationally sustainable
course.
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